Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co.
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 12148, 570 F.3d 606, 21 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1729 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
An employee with a chronic, relapsing-remitting condition like Chronic Fatigue Syndrome may be considered disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) if the condition substantially limits major life activities at the time of an adverse employment action. An employer's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination may be found pretextual if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the employer was actually motivated by the employee's disability or request for accommodation.
Facts:
- In 1987, Lorin Netterville was diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), but her symptoms went into remission after a short course of treatment.
- In 2001, Netterville was hired as a full-time employee by Chevron Phillips Chemical Company (CPChem) after completing a medical questionnaire where she answered 'no' to questions about 'excessive fatigue with work or exercise' and 'blood condition,' as CFS was not listed and she had been asymptomatic for 13 years.
- In mid-2002, Netterville's CFS symptoms recurred severely, causing significant sleep disruption, cognitive difficulties, pain, and an inability to perform daily self-care tasks like showering and dressing without assistance.
- On February 5, 2003, Netterville informed her supervisor, Gary Thurman, of her CFS recurrence, provided a doctor's note requesting two weeks of medical leave, and gave him informational materials about the syndrome.
- Upon returning from leave, Netterville first presented a doctor's note requesting to work at a location closer to her home, which Thurman rejected.
- Netterville then presented a second doctor's note requesting accommodations to alternate typing and reading and to rest during her lunch break.
- CPChem human resources and medical staff, operating under the incorrect assumption that CFS was a blood disorder, began investigating whether Netterville had falsified her pre-employment questionnaire.
- On February 27, 2003, after a meeting where managers questioned her about the questionnaire, CPChem terminated Netterville, stating the reason was 'falsifying' information on her medical questionnaire.
Procedural Posture:
- The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit on behalf of Lorin Netterville against Chevron Phillips Chemical Company (CPChem) in U.S. District Court.
- CPChem moved for summary judgment, arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact for trial.
- A magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of CPChem.
- The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment for CPChem, dismissing the EEOC's case.
- The EEOC, as appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff raise genuine issues of material fact regarding whether an employee is disabled, whether an employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation, and whether the employer's reason for termination was pretext for discrimination under the ADA, thereby making summary judgment for the employer improper?
Opinions:
Majority - Dennis, Circuit Judge
Yes, the EEOC raised genuine issues of material fact on all points, making summary judgment for the employer improper. A reasonable jury could find that Netterville's Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) constituted a disability under the ADA by substantially limiting the major life activities of caring for herself, sleeping, and thinking. The court reasoned that the relevant time for assessing a disability is the time of the adverse employment action, and an impairment does not need to be 'utterly incapacitating' or permanent to qualify; intermittent but severe conditions are covered. Netterville's testimony about needing assistance with bathing, severe insomnia, and cognitive fog was sufficient evidence. Furthermore, a jury could find CPChem failed its duty to engage in an 'interactive process' for accommodation when its manager summarily rejected her first request and remained silent on the second. Finally, a jury could reasonably find that CPChem's stated reason for firing Netterville—falsifying her medical questionnaire—was pretextual, given the plausible truthfulness of her answers, the suspicious timing of the investigation immediately following her disability disclosure, and the company's shifting and factually incorrect rationales (e.g., wrongly classifying CFS as a blood disorder).
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that chronic, episodic conditions like CFS can qualify as disabilities under the ADA, rejecting a narrow interpretation that requires impairments to be constant and permanent. It reinforces that the disability analysis is individualized and must focus on the employee's actual limitations, not on their ability to perform their job despite those limitations, thus avoiding a 'catch-22' for plaintiffs. The opinion serves as a strong warning to employers against using minor or questionable discrepancies in pre-employment documents as a pretext to terminate an employee who reveals a disability. It also underscores the employer's affirmative duty to engage in a good-faith interactive process to find reasonable accommodations.
