Enriquez v. Commonwealth
Not provided in text (2012)
Rule of Law:
When an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway with the key in the ignition switch, they are in actual physical control of the vehicle and are therefore guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under Code § 18.2-266.
Facts:
- About 3:00 a.m. on September 18, 2009, Thomas Feeney, a parking enforcement officer, observed Jean Paul Enriquez's Toyota automobile illegally parked in a bus stop in the City of Alexandria.
- Feeney heard the car’s radio playing and saw Enriquez asleep in the driver’s seat, but after repeated efforts, Feeney was unable to arouse him and called for police assistance.
- Officer Aloysius Asonglefac and Sergeant May of the Alexandria Police Department arrived and also found Enriquez sleeping behind the wheel of the Toyota.
- After officers repeatedly knocked on the car and shone a flashlight, Enriquez awoke and, after several requests, opened the driver’s side window.
- Officer Asonglefac smelled a strong odor of alcohol and marijuana coming from the car, and Enriquez appeared confused, thinking he was in Arlington and going to see his girlfriend but was unsure of her location.
- Enriquez initially denied drinking but then stated he had a 'Long Island Iced Tea' about an hour prior to the encounter with police.
- Enriquez failed field sobriety tests administered by Officer Asonglefac and was placed under arrest for driving under the influence.
- Officer Asonglefac observed the car's radio playing and light from the radio area, and noted the keys were in the ignition; the radio went off when the keys were removed.
Procedural Posture:
- Jean Paul Enriquez was convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (second offense within five years) in a bench trial in the circuit court.
- The circuit court sentenced Enriquez to twelve months confinement (with all but sixty days suspended), a $500 fine, and revoked his operator’s license for three years.
- Enriquez appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
- The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the conviction.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia awarded Enriquez an appeal.
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Issue:
Does sitting intoxicated in the driver's seat of a vehicle on a public highway with the key in the ignition constitute "operating" a motor vehicle under Code § 18.2-266, even if the engine is not running and there is no direct evidence of manipulation of controls?
Opinions:
Majority - Senior Justice Harry L. Carrico
Yes, sitting intoxicated in the driver's seat of a vehicle on a public highway with the key in the ignition constitutes "operating" a motor vehicle under Code § 18.2-266, establishing actual physical control. The Court held that the statutory definition of "operator" in Code § 46.2-100, which defines an operator as a person in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle on a highway, is controlling. The court explicitly overruled Stevenson v. City of Falls Church by adopting the reasoning of its dissent, stating that the position of the key in the ignition switch (i.e., whether it is in the 'on' or 'off' position) is not determinative when assessing actual physical control. The court established a clear rule that an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a vehicle on a public highway with the key in the ignition is in actual physical control. While manipulation of mechanical or electrical equipment can prove operation, it is not necessary; only evidence of actual physical control is required. Applying this rule, the evidence showed Enriquez was drunk, seated behind the steering wheel of his vehicle on a public street, and the key was in the ignition switch, which was sufficient to prove actual physical control and support his conviction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and strengthens the interpretation of "operating" a motor vehicle under Virginia's DUI statute, particularly in situations where an intoxicated individual is found in a parked vehicle. By overruling Stevenson v. City of Falls Church regarding the significance of the key's position and adopting the Stevenson dissent's reasoning, the Court established a more definitive and expansive standard for "actual physical control." This decision broadens the scope of DUI liability to encompass individuals who are merely capable of immediately putting a vehicle in motion while intoxicated, without requiring evidence of active manipulation or the engine running. Consequently, this ruling likely facilitates easier prosecution in 'sleeper DUI' cases, reducing the burden on the Commonwealth to demonstrate active driving and underscoring a preventative approach to drunk driving.
