Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.
570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, 77 N.Y.2d 377 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An injury to a mother that results in injuries to a later-conceived child does not establish a cause of action in favor of the child against the original tortfeasor. Liability for a defective product does not extend to a third generation of plaintiffs who were not exposed to the product in utero.
Facts:
- Karen Enright's maternal grandmother ingested the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) during her pregnancy.
- This pregnancy resulted in the birth of Patricia Enright (Karen's mother) on January 29, 1960.
- Due to her in utero exposure to DES, Patricia Enright developed abnormalities and deformities in her reproductive system.
- As a result of these reproductive issues, Patricia Enright's subsequent pregnancies were adversely affected, leading to spontaneous abortions.
- One of Patricia Enright's pregnancies resulted in the premature birth of her daughter, Karen Enright, on August 9, 1981.
- Karen Enright suffers from cerebral palsy and other disabilities, which are attributed to her premature birth.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia and Earl Enright, individually and on behalf of their daughter Karen Enright, sued several DES manufacturers in the New York Supreme Court, which is the trial court of first instance.
- The defendant manufacturers moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint.
- The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion as to the causes of action brought on behalf of Karen Enright, but denied it for claims related to Patricia Enright's own injuries.
- Both parties filed cross-appeals to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division modified the trial court's order by reinstating Karen Enright's cause of action based on strict products liability, while affirming the dismissal of her other claims.
- The defendants were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a child have a cognizable cause of action in strict products liability against a drug manufacturer for injuries allegedly caused by her mother's in utero exposure to a drug (DES) that was ingested by her grandmother?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Wachtler
No. A cause of action does not accrue in favor of a third-generation infant plaintiff for injuries allegedly caused by a defective product ingested by her grandmother. The court extended the reasoning of Albala v. City of New York, which declined to recognize a cause of action for a preconception tort, finding that doing so would extend traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds. The court rejected the argument that the unique nature of DES litigation warranted a different outcome, noting that prior judicial and legislative accommodations for DES victims were meant to remove procedural barriers, not to create new, multi-generational causes of action. The court expressed concern that recognizing such a claim would have 'staggering implications' and create an endless chain of liability, as the 'rippling effects of DES exposure may extend for generations.' Public policy favors limiting liability to those directly exposed (the first and second generations) to avoid overdeterrence that could discourage the development of beneficial prescription drugs.
Dissenting - Judge Hancock, Jr.
Yes. A child should have a cognizable cause of action in strict products liability for preconception injuries caused by a defective product like DES. The dissent argues that the majority's decision arbitrarily denies a remedy to an innocent victim of a massive wrong and ignores the legislative and judicial policies established to aid DES victims. The reliance on Albala is misplaced because that case involved medical negligence, not strict products liability for a mass-marketed defective drug, a distinction the Albala court itself made. The policy concerns from Albala, such as 'defensive medicine,' are not relevant here. Foreseeability and causation are questions for a jury, and dismissing the claim on policy grounds violates the fundamental principle that 'like cases should be treated alike,' as Karen Enright is no less a victim than others harmed by DES.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant public policy limitation on tort liability, effectively creating a bright-line rule that prevents liability from extending to third-generation plaintiffs. It solidifies the precedent from Albala, applying its policy-based refusal to recognize preconception torts from the negligence context to the realm of strict products liability. By doing so, the court prioritized the goal of creating 'manageable limits' on liability over the goal of compensating all individuals foreseeably harmed by a tortious act. This case signals a judicial reluctance to expand liability across generations, even in mass tort scenarios, impacting future claims involving latent, transgenerational injuries from toxic substances or other products.
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