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English v. General Electric Co.

Supreme Court of United States
496 U.S. 72 (1990)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not pre-empted by federal nuclear safety laws where the state law is not motivated by safety concerns and does not have a direct and substantial effect on the radiological safety decisions of nuclear facility operators.


Facts:

  • Vera M. English worked as a laboratory technician at a nuclear-fuels production facility operated by General Electric Company (GE).
  • In February 1984, English complained to GE management and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about multiple nuclear-safety violations at the facility.
  • Frustrated by a lack of response, English deliberately failed to clean a contaminated work area and instead outlined it with red tape to draw attention to the hazard.
  • Shortly thereafter, GE charged English with a safety violation, reassigned her, and informed her that her employment would be terminated unless she secured another position within the facility that did not involve exposure to nuclear materials.
  • English failed to find another position and her employment was terminated on July 30, 1984.
  • English alleged that in addition to her termination, GE engaged in a campaign of harassment, which included removing her from her post under guard, assigning her to degrading "make work," deriding her as paranoid, and isolating her from co-workers.

Procedural Posture:

  • Vera M. English filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, alleging that General Electric Company (GE) had violated the whistleblower protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act.
  • An Administrative Law Judge found in favor of English, but the Secretary of Labor dismissed the complaint as untimely filed.
  • English then filed a diversity action against GE in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, bringing state-law claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
  • The District Court granted GE's motion to dismiss the IIED claim, holding it was pre-empted by federal law.
  • English, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's dismissal.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.

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Issue:

Does federal law, specifically the whistleblower protection provision (§ 210) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, pre-empt a state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by a nuclear facility employee against her employer for retaliatory conduct?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Blackmun

No, federal law does not pre-empt the state-law tort claim. A state-law claim is not pre-empted by federal nuclear safety regulations unless it falls within the federally occupied field of nuclear safety or actually conflicts with the federal statutory scheme. First, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not fall within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety because the state tort law is not motivated by radiological safety concerns, and its potential effect on a nuclear facility's safety decisions is not direct and substantial. Second, the claim does not actually conflict with the federal whistleblower protection statute, § 210. The federal law's provision denying remedies to employees who deliberately cause a safety violation (§ 210(g)) does not bar state remedies. Furthermore, the absence of punitive damages and the existence of a short statute of limitations in the federal scheme do not imply a congressional intent to foreclose broader state-law remedies that have traditionally been available.



Analysis:

This case clarifies the scope of federal field pre-emption in the area of nuclear safety, setting a high bar for displacing traditional state tort remedies. The Court established that for a state law to be pre-empted on field grounds, it must either be motivated by safety concerns or have a 'direct and substantial effect' on radiological safety decisions. This ruling preserves an avenue for employees in federally regulated industries to seek redress for wrongful employer conduct under state law, so long as the state claim does not directly interfere with the core federal regulatory purpose. It signals that courts should not infer pre-emption of state common law claims simply because a detailed federal remedial scheme exists.

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