Engblom v. Carey
522 F. Supp. 57 (1981)
Rule of Law:
The Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering soldiers applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and its protection of an 'Owner' in a 'house' extends beyond fee simple ownership but does not cover occupants, such as employees, whose possessory interest is substantially limited and subordinate to the consent of the property's legal owner.
Facts:
- Marianne A. Engblom and Charles E. Palmer were correction officers at Mid-Orange Correctional Facility who resided in dormitory-style staff housing on the prison grounds.
- Engblom and Palmer paid a monthly fee, deducted from their payroll, for their rooms and had signed a 'Rules and Regulations' document governing their occupancy.
- In April 1979, Engblom, Palmer, and other correction officers participated in a statewide strike, leaving their posts.
- In response, New York Governor Carey activated the New York National Guard to provide security at correctional facilities, including Mid-Orange.
- Superintendent Joseph C. Snow declared a state of emergency and barred striking officers, including the plaintiffs, from accessing the facility and their on-site housing.
- On April 25, 1979, the striking officers were permitted to enter their rooms to pack and remove their personal belongings.
- Following the removal of belongings, National Guard soldiers were housed in the vacated staff building rooms.
- The State of New York, as the legal owner of the correctional facility and its housing, consented to the quartering of the soldiers.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Marianne A. Engblom and Charles E. Palmer filed suit against Governor Carey and other New York state and National Guard officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The complaint alleged violations of the Third and Fourteenth Amendments, among other claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.
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Issue:
Does the quartering of National Guard soldiers in state-owned prison staff housing occupied by striking correction officers, without the officers' consent, violate the Third Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Sweet, District Judge
No. The quartering of National Guard soldiers in the state-owned staff housing did not violate the Third Amendment because the plaintiffs lacked a sufficient property interest to be considered 'Owners' whose consent was required. The court first determined that National Guardsmen are 'soldiers' for Third Amendment purposes and that the amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The central issue then became whether the plaintiffs' interest in their dormitory rooms qualified them as 'Owners' of a 'house.' Analogizing to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court found that these terms are not limited to literal fee simple ownership but require a significant possessory interest and a legitimate expectation of privacy. Upon examining the plaintiffs' occupancy, the court concluded it was most analogous to 'possession incident to employment,' which confers fewer rights than a tenancy. This conclusion was based on the fact that housing was provided solely for prison personnel, occupancy was tied to employment, and the state retained significant control, including inspection rights and a master key. Because the plaintiffs' possessory interest was subordinate to that of the State of New York, which was the only legal 'owner' and which consented to the quartering, the plaintiffs' Third Amendment claim failed. As an alternative holding, the court reasoned that by participating in the illegal strike, the plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished whatever possessory rights they had for the duration of the strike.
Analysis:
This case represents one of the most significant and direct judicial interpretations of the Third Amendment. By applying an analytical framework similar to Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, the court established that the amendment's protections are not absolute and depend on the nature of the occupant's property interest. The decision carves out a distinction between tenants and those with occupancy incident to employment, suggesting the latter have a weaker claim to Third Amendment protection, especially when the legal owner is the government and it consents to the quartering. This precedent significantly narrows the potential application of the Third Amendment in contexts involving government-provided housing for employees, establishing a high bar for such claims to succeed.
