Endresz v. Friedberg
248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 24 N.Y.2d 478 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
Under New York's wrongful death statute, a cause of action cannot be maintained for a stillborn fetus because a fetus must be born alive to be considered a 'decedent' with legal rights that can be pursued by its personal representative.
Facts:
- Janice Endresz, while seven months pregnant with twins, was injured in an automobile accident.
- The accident was allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendants.
- Two days following the accident, Janice Endresz was delivered of two stillborn twins, a male and a female.
- The parents sought damages for the loss of their children's anticipated care and comfort, as well as for medical, hospital, and funeral expenses.
Procedural Posture:
- Steve Endresz, as administrator for the stillborn twins, and Janice Endresz sued the defendants in a New York trial court (Special Term).
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the wrongful death actions and the parents' separate claims for loss of companionship.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the wrongful death lawsuits and the specific loss of companionship claims.
- The plaintiffs appealed the dismissals to the intermediate appellate court (the Appellate Division).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does New York's wrongful death statute permit a cause of action for a fetus that is negligently injured in the womb and subsequently stillborn?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Fuld
No, New York's wrongful death statute does not permit a cause of action for a stillborn fetus. To qualify as a 'decedent' under the statute, a person must be born alive. The court reasoned that the legislature, in creating the wrongful death action, did not intend to include an unborn fetus. Distinguishing its prior holding in Woods v. Lancet (which allowed a child born alive to sue for prenatal injuries), the court found the policy considerations different; Woods aimed to allow a child to begin life unimpaired, a concern absent for a stillborn fetus. Furthermore, the court held that proving causation and pecuniary damages for a stillborn child is excessively speculative. Allowing such a claim would also create an 'unmerited bounty' for the parents, who can already recover for their own physical and emotional injuries, turning compensation into punishment for the defendant. The court concluded that birth is the most 'tangible and concrete' and therefore the most 'workable boundary' for establishing a cause of action.
Dissenting - Judge Burke
Yes, a wrongful death action should be permitted for a stillborn fetus. The dissent argued that the only condition of the wrongful death statute is that the decedent would have had a cause of action had death not ensued. Since Woods v. Lancet established that a viable fetus injured in utero has a cause of action if born alive, that condition is met at the time of injury. The majority's reliance on the necessity of birth is an illogical distinction that revives the outmoded reasoning of Drobner v. Peters, which Woods overruled. This creates an 'absurd result' where a tortfeasor is liable for injuring a fetus but immune from a wrongful death suit if the injury is severe enough to cause a stillbirth. The dissent dismissed concerns about proving damages, noting that courts routinely handle complex proof issues and that this same argument was rejected in Woods.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the 'born alive' rule as a bright-line precedent for wrongful death actions in New York. It creates a clear legal distinction between prenatal injuries resulting in live birth (for which a cause of action exists) and those resulting in stillbirth (for which no wrongful death action lies). The ruling prioritizes a clear, administrable rule over a more flexible standard like viability, thereby limiting the scope of recovery for prenatal torts. This case solidifies the legal principle that a fetus does not have a separate juridical existence for tort purposes until it is born alive, influencing how damages are calculated and allocated in cases involving harm to pregnant women.
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