Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Supreme Court of the United States
494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes conduct that the individual's religion prescribes.

Facts:

Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church.
As an integral part of their religious practice, Smith and Black participated in a sacramental ceremony where they ingested peyote.
Peyote is a hallucinogenic plant classified as a Schedule I controlled substance under Oregon state law.
The knowing or intentional possession of peyote was a felony under Oregon law, which made no exception for religious use.
Smith and Black were employed as counselors at a private drug rehabilitation organization.
The organization fired Smith and Black for their sacramental use of peyote.

Procedural Posture:

Alfred Smith and Galen Black applied to the Employment Division for unemployment compensation.
The Employment Division determined they were ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related 'misconduct.'
Respondents appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the denial of benefits.
The Employment Division appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision.
The Employment Division successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case (in Smith I) for a determination of whether sacramental peyote use was illegal under Oregon law.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the use of peyote was a crime under Oregon law but that this prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause, reaffirming its prior ruling.
The Employment Division again petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does a neutral, generally applicable law that criminalizes certain conduct violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when applied to individuals who engage in that conduct as part of a religious practice?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Scalia

No. A neutral, generally applicable law that incidentally burdens a particular religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Clause protects the freedom to believe and profess any religious doctrine, but it does not excuse an individual from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. Applying the compelling interest test from Sherbert v. Verner to a generally applicable criminal law would be a constitutional anomaly, permitting every citizen to become 'a law unto himself.' Such a system would create a prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from a wide variety of civic obligations, which is unworkable in a diverse society. Any accommodation for such religious practices must be left to the political process and legislatures, not the courts.

Concurring - Justice O'Connor

No. Oregon's prohibition on peyote is constitutional as applied to Smith and Black, but the majority's reasoning is flawed and departs from established First Amendment jurisprudence. The correct approach is to apply the compelling interest test, not discard it. A law that prohibits religiously motivated conduct significantly burdens the free exercise of religion and must be justified by a compelling state interest. Here, Oregon has a compelling interest in protecting public health and safety by prohibiting the use of dangerous controlled substances. Granting a religious exemption in this case would unduly interfere with the fulfillment of that interest. Therefore, while the outcome is correct, it should have been reached by applying, not abandoning, the strict scrutiny standard.

Dissenting - Justice Blackmun

Yes. The Court's decision to abandon the compelling interest test effectuates a 'wholesale overturning of settled law' and represses minority religions. The proper analysis, as stated in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, requires the application of strict scrutiny. However, Oregon's interest is not compelling enough to outweigh the respondents' free exercise rights. The State's interest should be narrowly defined as its interest in denying an exemption for sacramental peyote use, not its broad interest in the 'war on drugs.' Oregon failed to present any evidence that the controlled, ceremonial use of peyote by the Native American Church has ever harmed anyone or that granting an exemption would hinder law enforcement. The State's interest is purely speculative and symbolic, which cannot justify the 'potentially devastating impact' on the respondents' ability to practice their religion.

Analysis:

This decision marked a major shift in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, significantly narrowing its protections. By holding that neutral, generally applicable laws are not subject to the compelling interest test, the Court made it much more difficult for religious minorities to challenge laws that incidentally burden their practices. The ruling effectively transferred the power to grant religious accommodations from the judiciary to the legislature. This change spurred Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an attempt to legislatively reinstate the compelling interest test for all laws affecting religious exercise.

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