Elmore v. Ramos
489 S.E.2d 663, 1997 S.C. App. LEXIS 90, 327 S.C. 507 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under South Carolina's strict liability dog-injury statute, the phrase 'otherwise attacks' encompasses a dog's act of jumping on or pouncing on a person, regardless of the dog's intent or motive.
Facts:
- Karen Elmore and Helen and Tony Ramos were friends who visited each other frequently.
- While Elmore was visiting the Ramoses' home, she and Helen Ramos went to the backyard to feed rabbits.
- The Ramoses' Black Labrador Retriever was also in the backyard.
- At Helen Ramos's request, Elmore walked up a ramp to a shed to retrieve more rabbit food.
- Upon exiting the shed, the dog jumped on Elmore from behind, causing her to fall off the ramp.
- As a result of the fall, Elmore suffered a severe compound fracture to her leg, which required multiple surgeries and resulted in a permanent disability.
- Elmore testified that she did not believe the dog was being malicious, stating, 'It wasn't attacking me. It just jumped up on me from behind.'
Procedural Posture:
- Karen Elmore sued Tony and Helen Ramos in a South Carolina trial court to recover for her injuries.
- At the conclusion of Elmore's presentation of evidence at trial, the Ramoses moved for a directed verdict.
- The trial court granted the Ramoses' directed verdict motion, concluding the dog's action was not an 'attack' under the statute because it was not malicious.
- Elmore, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a dog jumping on a person, without malicious intent, constitute an 'attack' under S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-110, thereby subjecting the owner to strict liability for the resulting injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - Goolsby
Yes, a dog jumping on a person constitutes an 'attack' under S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-110, and the owner is strictly liable for any resulting injuries. The court reasoned that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislature's intent by giving statutory words their plain and ordinary meaning. Consulting dictionary definitions, the court found that 'attack' includes actions like 'set upon' or 'pounce upon,' which do not require a showing of vicious intent. The legislature's inclusion of the phrase 'otherwise attacks' in addition to 'bites' indicates a clear intent to cover injuries caused by actions other than biting. Furthermore, because the statute does not require proof of an evil motive for a bite, it logically follows that no such motive is required for other forms of attack like jumping. The court also noted that pre-statute common law defined a 'vicious propensity' to include dangerous acts motivated by mere playfulness, reinforcing the conclusion that legislative silence on motive implies none is required.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of South Carolina's strict liability statute for dog-related injuries by expanding the definition of an 'attack.' It establishes that the dog owner's liability is not contingent on the animal's subjective intent or viciousness, but rather on the objective nature and result of its physical actions. This lowers the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs, who no longer need to prove a dog's malicious state of mind and can recover for injuries caused by actions that might be considered playful. The ruling clarifies that the focus of the statute is on compensating victims for injuries caused by dogs, shifting the risk of harm, regardless of intent, to the owner.
