Ellis v. Prevost
19 La. 251 (1841)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff's civil possession, which is the intent to possess a property, is sufficient to bring a possessory action if it was preceded by the actual, corporeal possession of the property by their vendor.
Facts:
- On February 6, 1829, P. S. Cocke sold a large tract of land on both sides of bayou Grand Caillou to John Hutchings.
- In 1829 or 1830, Hutchings took possession of the tract, placed an overseer and seven workers on it, built cabins, cleared about 150 arpents, and raised a crop, with this actual occupation lasting about 22 months.
- Hutchings also permitted two other individuals to cultivate parts of the land at different times.
- The defendants, the Prevost family, and their ancestors had long resided on the west side of the bayou within a small, enclosed area measuring four arpents in front by two and a half in depth.
- The Prevosts also occupied and cultivated other various, unenclosed, and inconsiderable parts of the land in controversy at different times.
- On June 28, 1836, Hutchings sold the entire tract of land to the plaintiff, Ellis.
- Ellis never resided on the property and abandoned the improvements his vendor, Hutchings, had made.
- Approximately 18 months before the first trial, two individuals, Champagne and Daspit, began residing on a portion of the land with the permission of the Prevosts.
Procedural Posture:
- Ellis, the plaintiff, filed a possessory action against the Prevosts, the defendants, in the district court (trial court) in February 1837.
- Following a trial, a judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiff appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
- The Supreme Court of Louisiana heard the case and remanded it for a new trial.
- A second trial was held in the district court, where a jury again returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiff, Ellis, appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for a second time.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's civil possession of a property, derived from the prior actual and corporeal possession of his vendor, satisfy the legal requirement of having 'real and actual possession' at the time of a disturbance in order to bring a possessory action?
Opinions:
Majority - Simon, J.
Yes, civil possession is sufficient when it has been preceded by the corporeal enjoyment of the thing. The court distinguishes between natural possession (corporeal detention) and civil possession (the will to possess after corporeal detention has ceased). Possession is acquired through the former and preserved by the latter. A plaintiff in a possessory action can benefit from the prior corporeal possession of their vendor. Article 49 of the Code of Practice, which requires 'real and actual possession,' is not to be read literally, as that would lead to absurd results where a temporarily absent owner could not sue an intruder. Instead, it means the possession must originate from a prior corporeal possession, which Ellis's possession did through his vendor, Hutchings. In contrast, for a defendant to claim possession without title, they must show adverse possession by enclosures or defined metes and bounds. The Prevosts only proved such possession for the small, enclosed tract around their home; their claims to other unenclosed parts were too vague and are therefore disregarded.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for clarifying the nature of possession required to maintain a possessory action under Louisiana law. It establishes the principle of 'tacking' possession, allowing a purchaser to rely on their seller's prior physical occupation to establish their own right to sue for disturbances. By interpreting the 'real and actual possession' requirement of the Code of Practice flexibly, the court prevented an absurdly strict reading that would undermine property rights for non-resident owners. The ruling also reinforces the established doctrine that claims of adverse possession without title must be based on clear, defined boundaries, such as enclosures, thereby limiting vague claims over large, unenclosed tracts.
