Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles
2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1496, 187 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A public entity is not liable for failing to promptly serve a writ of execution based on a creditor's instructions for expediency, as the timing of service within the statutory period is a discretionary act, and no mandatory duty to act with a specific urgency is imposed by statute.
Facts:
- Bobby Frank Ellerbee held a superior court judgment against entertainer Todd Anthony Shaw for over $1 million.
- On June 21, 2007, Ellerbee's attorney delivered a writ of execution to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department, with written instructions to serve it on Sony BMG 'as soon as possible' because Shaw was receiving royalties.
- On July 5, Ellerbee's attorney contacted the sheriff's department again, stressing the importance of prompt service.
- On July 19, before the writ was served, Sony BMG paid $10,000 to Shaw.
- The Sheriff's department served the writ on Sony BMG on August 14, 2007.
- On September 5, Ellerbee's attorney sent supplemental instructions for the Sheriff to serve a writ on MTV Networks 'as soon as possible' because Shaw was beginning a weekly television show.
- Between September 6 and October 12, MTV paid Shaw a total of $56,799.30.
- The Sheriff's department served the writ on MTV on October 12, 2007.
Procedural Posture:
- After exhausting administrative remedies, Bobby Frank Ellerbee filed a negligence action against the County of Los Angeles and its Sheriff in the superior court (trial court).
- The trial court ordered the parties to participate in a mediation.
- Ellerbee filed a motion for monetary sanctions against the defendants and their counsel, Henry Patrick Nelson, for failing to participate in the mediation in good faith.
- The trial court granted the sanctions motion, ordering the County, Sheriff, and Nelson to jointly and severally pay $6,194.
- The County and Sheriff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing they were immune from suit. The trial court denied this motion.
- Following a trial, a jury found in favor of Ellerbee on his negligence claim against the County and awarded him damages of $39,230.
- The County of Los Angeles (appellant) appealed from the final judgment and the pretrial order imposing sanctions to the California Court of Appeal. Ellerbee is the respondent.
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Issue:
Does a public entity have a mandatory statutory duty to serve a writ of execution 'promptly' or 'as soon as possible' based solely on a judgment creditor's written instructions, making the entity liable for damages under Government Code section 815.6 for delays in service?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, J.
No. A public entity does not have a mandatory statutory duty to serve a writ 'promptly' at a creditor's request because the relevant statutes do not impose specific timing requirements beyond the overall statutory deadline for the writ's validity. Under the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 815), public entity liability must be based on a specific statute, not common law negligence. Liability under Government Code section 815.6 requires the violation of a 'mandatory duty.' While Code of Civil Procedure sections 687.010 and 699.530 require a levying officer to act 'in accordance with written instructions,' this applies to the substance of the instructions, not timing requests. A creditor's request to act 'promptly' or 'as soon as possible' does not strip the Sheriff of the discretion to allocate resources and determine when to effect service. As long as the service is completed within the writ's 180-day statutory life, no mandatory duty regarding the speed of service has been violated.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle of sovereign immunity under the California Tort Claims Act, clarifying that government liability for ministerial duties is narrowly construed. It establishes that while a levying officer must follow a creditor's instructions on what to levy and whom to serve, the operational timing of that service is a discretionary function. This ruling protects public entities from liability for delays that may result from resource allocation or workload prioritization, so long as they comply with absolute statutory deadlines. Consequently, the financial risk of such administrative delays falls upon the judgment creditor, not the public entity tasked with enforcement.
