Ekiu v. United States
142 U.S. 651 (1892)
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Rule of Law:
Congress has the constitutional authority to delegate to executive branch officers the final and conclusive power to determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is eligible for admission, and such a determination, made according to statute, constitutes due process of law.
Facts:
- Nishimura Ekiu, a female subject of the Emperor of Japan, arrived by steamship at the port of San Francisco.
- John L. Hatch, a U.S. inspector of immigration, conducted an inspection and examination of Ekiu.
- Following the examination, Hatch determined that Ekiu was a person 'likely to become a public charge.'
- Based on this finding, Hatch, acting under the authority of the Immigration Act of 1891, refused to permit Ekiu to land in the United States.
- Ekiu was subsequently detained and restrained of her liberty, pending her return to Japan.
Procedural Posture:
- After being denied entry, Nishimura Ekiu filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.
- While the petition was pending, immigration inspector John L. Hatch formally intervened in the proceeding, citing his decision to deny entry as a bar to the writ.
- The Circuit Court, after a hearing, dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and remanded Ekiu to the custody of the immigration inspector for deportation.
- Nishimura Ekiu then appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a federal statute that grants final authority to an executive immigration officer to determine an alien's right to enter the United States, without judicial review of the factual basis for that decision, violate the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Gray
No. A federal statute granting final authority to an executive officer to determine an alien's right to enter the country is a constitutional exercise of congressional power. The power to exclude foreigners is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty, vested in the political departments of the government—Congress and the Executive—not the judiciary. Congress may delegate the execution of its immigration laws to executive officers and may entrust the final determination of factual questions to them. For an alien who has not yet entered the country and has acquired no domicile or residence, the decision of an executive officer acting within the powers conferred by Congress is due process of law. The Act of 1891 explicitly states that an adverse decision by an inspection officer is 'final' unless appealed to the superintendent of immigration, manifesting a clear intent to preclude judicial review of the officer's factual findings.
Dissenting - Justice Brewer
The provided case text notes the dissent but does not include the reasoning for it.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational pillar of U.S. immigration law, establishing the plenary power doctrine, which grants the legislative and executive branches vast authority over immigration matters. It severely curtails the judiciary's role in reviewing the substantive decisions of immigration officials, particularly concerning the admission of aliens. The ruling solidifies the principle that for non-citizens seeking entry, procedural due process does not require judicial review, and an administrative decision can be final and conclusive. This creates a significant legal distinction between the rights of individuals at the border and those already within the United States.
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