Edwards v. State
181 N.W.2d 383, 49 Wis. 2d 105, 1970 Wisc. LEXIS 878 (1970)
Rule of Law:
An intent to collect a general monetary debt by force or gunpoint does not negate the specific intent to steal required for robbery, as general money in a debtor's possession is not the specific property of the creditor to which the collector has a present right of possession. Furthermore, a trial court acts within its discretion by excluding evidence whose probative value is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice or jury confusion, such as a witness displaying an arm for needle marks, or by limiting reputation testimony not based on a broad community consensus.
Facts:
- Edwards telephoned Higgins, an old acquaintance, asking him to pay a $150 debt from September 1965 for clothes.
- Edwards and Hill later went to Higgins' apartment building.
- Higgins claimed Edwards and Hill forced their way into his apartment, pointed a gun at him, and demanded money.
- Edwards claimed Higgins voluntarily opened the door and invited them upstairs, and that Higgins then stated he had locked himself out of his apartment when Edwards asked for the $150.
- Ronald Bufford, a visitor, entered the first-floor stairway of the apartment building and heard Higgins mention a 'stickup.'
- Bufford continued to ascend the stairway and saw a gun in Hill’s hand at the top of the stairs.
- Hill fired the gun, hitting Bufford.
- Edwards and Hill left the apartment building without taking any money from Higgins.
- During the trial, Higgins admitted that he had injected heroin into his arm about seventy-two hours prior to testifying.
Procedural Posture:
- Edwards and Hill were charged with attempted armed robbery in a state trial court (court of first instance).
- During the trial, the court refused to compel witness Higgins to display his arm to the jury or to Detective Thelen.
- The trial court limited the questioning of Detective Thelen regarding Higgins' reputation for truth and veracity.
- The trial court instructed the jury that an indebtedness is not a defense to a charge of attempted armed robbery.
- Edwards and Hill were convicted of attempted armed robbery in the trial court.
- Edwards and Hill appealed their convictions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred on these three points.
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Issue:
1. Does a bona fide belief that one is collecting a debt negate the intent to steal, thereby providing a defense to a charge of attempted armed robbery when money is taken by force or gunpoint? 2. Does a trial court err by refusing to compel a witness to display their arm to the jury or an alleged expert to impeach credibility based on recent narcotic injection marks, particularly when the witness admits recent use? 3. Does a trial court err by limiting cross-examination on a witness's reputation for truth and veracity when the impeaching witness's knowledge is based on varied opinions of a limited number of people, rather than a community consensus?
Opinions:
Majority - Hallows, C. J.
No, a bona fide belief that one is collecting a debt does not negate the specific intent to steal required for robbery, and thus is not a defense to attempted armed robbery. The court rejects the view held by a majority of other jurisdictions. It reasoned that while reclaiming one's specific, identifiable property by force might not be armed robbery, taking general money from a debtor by force, even to satisfy a debt, constitutes an intent to permanently deprive the owner (the debtor) of possession of that specific money. The court distinguished between specific personal property and general money, stating that a creditor does not own the specific coins and bills in a debtor's pocket; the debtor does. Allowing self-help by force to collect a general debt would lead to public policy concerns and an illogical extension of the law. The deterrence and punishment for such conduct are satisfied by lesser crimes. No, the trial court did not err in refusing to compel Higgins to display his arm to the jury or Detective Thelen. The court found that the trial court acted within its discretion. Regarding the jury, it was deemed not competent to determine the recentness of needle marks from observation alone, and the probative value of such a display was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice (applying Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence). As for Detective Thelen, the court agreed with the trial court that Thelen lacked the necessary expert qualification to accurately judge the freshness of needle marks from observation and to translate such indications into a precise timeframe. No, the trial court did not err in limiting Detective Thelen’s testimony regarding Higgins’ reputation for truth and veracity. The court determined that Thelen could not provide proper reputation testimony because his knowledge was based on the varying opinions of only 12 people, which did not constitute a 'reasonable consensus or popular opinion' necessary to establish a community reputation for truthfulness, as opposed to merely a private opinion.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the 'claim of right' defense in robbery cases within Wisconsin, rejecting the widely accepted view in many other jurisdictions. It firmly establishes that using force to collect a general monetary debt constitutes robbery, drawing a critical distinction between specific, identifiable property and fungible money. The decision reinforces the principle that self-help by force is generally impermissible for debt collection and that the specific intent to steal (animus furandi) is present when one forcibly takes money that is not specifically theirs from another's possession. The rulings on evidentiary issues further emphasize the broad discretion of trial courts in balancing probative value against potential prejudice and maintaining rigorous standards for expert qualifications and reputation testimony.
