Edwards v. South Carolina
372 U.S. 229 (1963)
Rule of Law:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from convicting peaceful protestors for the common-law offense of breach of the peace when their conduct consists of non-violent expression of unpopular views, even if it attracts a crowd or causes public inconvenience.
Facts:
- On March 2, 1961, 187 Black high school and college students (the petitioners) met at a church in Columbia, South Carolina.
- They walked in small, orderly groups to the South Carolina State House grounds, an area open to the general public.
- Their stated purpose was to peacefully protest discriminatory laws and express their grievances to the state's citizens and legislature.
- For approximately 45 minutes, the petitioners walked through the grounds carrying placards with messages such as 'Down with segregation.'
- A crowd of 200-300 onlookers gathered, but there was no evidence of any hostile gestures, threats, or violence from the crowd.
- Police authorities, who had ample presence at the scene, ordered the petitioners to disperse within 15 minutes.
- Instead of dispersing, the petitioners listened to a speech and sang patriotic and religious songs.
- After the 15-minute period expired, police arrested all 187 petitioners.
Procedural Posture:
- The 187 petitioners were tried and convicted of breach of the peace in a magistrate’s court in Columbia, South Carolina (court of first instance).
- The petitioners appealed their convictions to the Richland County Court, which affirmed the judgments.
- The petitioners then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court (state's highest court), which also affirmed the convictions.
- The petitioners successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state's conviction of peaceful protestors for the common-law crime of breach of the peace violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and to petition for redress of grievances, when the protestors' conduct was non-violent and did not incite violence?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. A state infringes upon constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and petition when it arrests, convicts, and punishes individuals for peacefully expressing unpopular views. The petitioners' actions were a 'pristine and classic' exercise of their First Amendment rights, as they peaceably assembled at the state capitol to express their grievances. The record is devoid of any violence, threat of violence, or 'fighting words,' and police protection was ample. Unlike the situation in Feiner v. New York, there was no incitement to riot or an unruly crowd threatening violence. The state applied a generalized and vaguely defined breach of the peace offense to criminalize the expression of views that were merely opposed by the majority of the community, which the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Clark
No. The state's action was a constitutionally permissible effort to prevent imminent disorder and violence. The majority understates the facts; the City Manager testified that 'a dangerous situation was really building up' due to the large crowd, the blocking of traffic, and the 'boisterous' nature of the demonstration. The petitioners responded to a reasonable dispersal order with defiance, a 'harangue,' and conduct that aroused them to a 'fever pitch.' State officials, acting in good faith, believed disorder was imminent and were not required to wait for a riot to occur before taking action to preserve the peace. The state's power to prevent a clear and present danger of riot or disorder is obvious, and the actions of law enforcement were a reasonable and necessary measure to avert a potential catastrophe.
Analysis:
This decision significantly protects expressive conduct, particularly in the context of the Civil Rights Movement. It limits the ability of states to use vague, catch-all offenses like 'breach of the peace' to suppress peaceful protests. The Court effectively holds that the government's duty is to protect the speaker from a hostile crowd (a 'heckler's veto'), rather than arresting the speaker to appease the crowd, unless there is a clear and present danger of riot that police cannot control. This precedent strengthens First Amendment protections for demonstrations in public forums and raises the bar for what conduct can be criminalized as a disturbance.
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