Edwards v. Edwards
2010 ND 2, 777 N.W.2d 606, 2010 WL 93165 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A court may grant visitation rights to a third party, such as a stepparent, over the objection of a natural parent if exceptional circumstances exist where denying visitation would cause serious harm or detriment to the child. However, such an award does not extend to granting the third party legal decision-making authority over the child.
Facts:
- Katherine and Robert Edwards married for the first time in '1989 or 1990' and divorced in September 1996.
- In December 1996, Katherine Edwards gave birth to a daughter, K.A.E., whose biological father was not Robert Edwards.
- Katherine and Robert Edwards remarried in September 1997.
- K.A.E. lived with Katherine and Robert Edwards from shortly after her birth, had minimal contact with her biological father, and knew Robert Edwards as her only father figure.
- In 2001, Katherine and Robert had twin children together.
- After raising K.A.E. for her entire life, Katherine and Robert Edwards initiated divorce proceedings for a second time in 2008.
Procedural Posture:
- Katherine and Robert Edwards initiated a divorce action in a North Dakota district court.
- The district court, as part of the divorce judgment, awarded Robert Edwards (stepfather) visitation rights and specific legal custody rights concerning his stepdaughter, K.A.E.
- Katherine Edwards (biological mother) appealed the district court's judgment to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction and erred in its findings.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a divorce proceeding, does a court have the authority to award both visitation and legal custody rights to a stepparent for a non-biological child over the objection of the natural parent?
Opinions:
Majority - Sandstrom, Justice
Yes, in part. A court has the authority to grant visitation to a stepparent under exceptional circumstances, but it does not have the authority to grant legal decision-making rights. The court reasoned that parents have a superior constitutional right to the custody of their children, but this right is not absolute. In 'exceptional circumstances,' where it is in the child's best interest to prevent serious harm, a court may award custody to a third party. Applying the maxim that 'the greater contains the less,' the court extended this logic to visitation. Here, although the trial court did not use the specific terms 'psychological parent' or 'exceptional circumstances,' its finding that Robert was the only 'father, in every sense of the word' K.A.E. had ever known was sufficient. The court concluded that severing this relationship would cause serious detriment to K.A.E. However, the court distinguished visitation from legal custody, holding that granting decision-making authority over education, health, and religion improperly infringed upon the natural parent's rights. Therefore, it affirmed the visitation award but reversed the grant of legal custody rights.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal framework in North Dakota for stepparent visitation rights after divorce. It formally extends the 'exceptional circumstances' test, traditionally used for third-party custody, to the lesser intrusion of visitation, prioritizing the child's psychological well-being when a strong parent-child bond exists with a non-biological parent. The ruling carefully balances the child's interests against the fundamental rights of natural parents by drawing a clear line between maintaining a significant relationship (visitation) and usurping parental authority (legal custody). This creates a precedent that allows courts to protect established, parent-like relationships while still upholding the primary decision-making role of the natural parent.
