Edmund v. Florida
458 U.S. 782 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others, but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be used.
Facts:
- On April 1, 1975, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the farmhouse of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple, under the pretext of needing water for their car.
- Sampson Armstrong robbed Mr. Kersey at gunpoint.
- When Mr. Kersey called for help, Mrs. Kersey came out with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong.
- Sampson Armstrong, and possibly Jeanette, then shot and killed both Mr. and Mrs. Kersey.
- Earl Enmund, who had allegedly planned the robbery, was waiting nearby in a car.
- Enmund drove the Armstrongs away from the scene after the robbery and murders.
- The evidence at trial supported the inference that Enmund was the driver of the getaway car but did not establish that he was present at the farmhouse during the killings.
Procedural Posture:
- Earl Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were indicted for first-degree murder and robbery in a Florida state trial court.
- Following a joint trial, a jury found Enmund guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery.
- In a separate sentencing hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty for Enmund.
- The trial judge, agreeing with the jury's recommendation, sentenced Enmund to death on both murder counts.
- Enmund appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which initially remanded the case for the trial judge to provide written findings supporting the sentence.
- After the trial judge issued his findings, Enmund again appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.
- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's convictions and the death sentences, holding that his role as the getaway driver made him a principal in the robbery and therefore guilty of first-degree felony murder.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Enmund’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does imposing the death penalty on a defendant who aided and abetted a felony that resulted in murder, but who did not personally kill, attempt to kill, or intend for a killing to occur, violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes. Imposing the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets a felony in which a murder is committed by others, but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reasoned that punishment must be proportionate to the crime. An analysis of objective factors, such as legislative judgments and jury sentencing decisions, reveals a societal consensus against capital punishment for a defendant who did not take a life. The court found that only a minority of states allowed for the death penalty in such vicarious felony-murder cases, and juries have overwhelmingly rejected it. Furthermore, the death penalty serves no valid penological purpose of either deterrence or retribution when applied to a defendant, like Enmund, who did not kill or intend to kill. His culpability is different from that of the actual killers, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.
Dissenting - Justice O'Connor
No. The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from executing a convicted felony murderer who was a major participant in the underlying felony, even if he did not personally kill or intend to kill. The dissent argued that the majority misread the state of the law, contending that a significant number of states do permit the death penalty for felony murder accomplices. It criticized the majority for making intent a matter of federal constitutional law, thereby interfering with state criteria for assessing legal guilt. The dissent reasoned that participating in a dangerous felony like armed robbery demonstrates a blameworthiness sufficient for capital punishment, as it involves a reckless disregard for human life. The determination of blameworthiness is best left to the sentencer, who can weigh the complex facts of each case, rather than being constrained by a rigid constitutional rule requiring proof of intent to kill.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes. Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to reiterate his long-held view that the death penalty is, in all circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Analysis:
Enmund v. Florida established a significant limitation on the use of the death penalty in felony-murder cases. By requiring an individualized inquiry into the defendant's culpability and intent to kill, the decision moved away from the traditional felony-murder rule's concept of vicarious liability for capital sentencing purposes. This precedent mandates that the focus must be on the 'character and record of the individual offender' and not just their participation in the underlying felony. The case set the stage for further refinement of this principle in Tison v. Arizona, which later clarified that major participation in the felony combined with reckless indifference to human life could also satisfy the Eighth Amendment's culpability requirement for a death sentence.
