Eckert v. Long Island R.R.
43 N.Y. 502 (1871)
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Rule of Law:
A person who attempts to save the life of another from imminent peril created by the negligence of a third party is not contributorily negligent unless the rescue attempt was rash or reckless.
Facts:
- A train operated by the defendant was approaching at a high rate of speed.
- A small child was on the railroad track, directly in the path of the oncoming train and in danger of being crushed.
- The plaintiff's intestate (the deceased) saw the child's extreme peril from a position of safety.
- The deceased ran onto the track in an attempt to rescue the child from the train.
- In the course of the rescue attempt, the deceased was struck and killed by the train.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, representing the deceased's estate, sued the defendant railroad in the City Court of Brooklyn.
- At trial, the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the grounds of the deceased's contributory negligence was denied.
- A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff.
- The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The defendant then appealed to this court (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does a person's attempt to save another from imminent danger caused by a defendant's negligence constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, thereby barring recovery for injuries sustained during the rescue?
Opinions:
Majority - Unauthored (Church, Ch. J., Peckham and Rapallo, JJ., concurring)
No. A person's effort to preserve human life will not be deemed negligent unless it was made under circumstances constituting rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. The law holds human life in such high regard that an attempt to save it is not wrongful. Unlike exposing oneself to danger for ordinary affairs or to protect property, risking one's life to save another's is not considered negligent unless the act is rash or reckless. The deceased had to act instantly, without time for deliberation, and it was his duty to judge whether he could probably save the child without serious injury to himself. The jury was therefore warranted in finding that the deceased was free from contributory negligence.
Dissenting - Unauthored (Folger, J., concurring)
Yes. The deceased's actions should bar recovery under the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' (to a willing person, injury is not done). The deceased voluntarily, with free will and full knowledge of the danger, went onto the tracks in front of an approaching train. This action was a result of his own choice, not a compulsion or a legal duty. Regardless of the defendant's negligence, one who knowingly and with liberty of choice places themselves in a position of danger does so at their own peril. While the act was praiseworthy, legal principles cannot be bent for sympathetic cases, and his voluntary assumption of a known risk should preclude recovery.
Analysis:
This case establishes the 'rescue doctrine,' a significant exception to the then-prevailing harsh rule of contributory negligence. By holding that a rescuer's conduct is not negligent unless it is rash or reckless, the court shields rescuers from being automatically barred from recovery. This doctrine encourages life-saving efforts by ensuring that the original tortfeasor who created the peril, rather than the rescuer, is held financially responsible for injuries sustained in the rescue. It shifted the legal analysis from a strict view of assumption of risk to a more nuanced evaluation of the reasonableness of the rescuer's actions under emergency circumstances.
