Eckels v. Johnson
526 P.2d 1100, 1974 Ida. LEXIS 426, 96 Idaho 264 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A genuine issue of material fact regarding a vehicle owner's implied consent for another's use of the vehicle can exist, precluding summary judgment, even when the owner has explicitly forbidden its use. Factors such as a close family relationship, leaving keys accessible, a history of prior use, and a lack of monitoring can create a triable issue for a jury.
Facts:
- Ivan Johnson owned a 1966 International truck.
- Johnson's son, Keith Johnson, had previously driven this truck and other family vehicles with his father's permission.
- More than a year prior to the accident, Ivan Johnson gave Keith explicit instructions not to drive the 1966 International truck, though Keith was permitted to drive another family vehicle.
- Ivan Johnson regularly left the ignition keys inside the truck when it was not in use, a fact known to his son.
- Johnson did not take measures such as checking the truck's gas, oil, or mileage to determine if it was being used without his permission.
- On December 9, 1971, Keith Johnson took the truck without his father's knowledge or express permission.
- While driving the truck, Keith Johnson was involved in an accident, striking a vehicle owned by Thomas W. Eckels.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas W. Eckels sued Ivan Johnson in the magistrate's division of the district court to recover for property damage.
- Johnson moved for summary judgment, arguing he had not given his son permission to drive the vehicle.
- The magistrate's court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnson.
- Eckels, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the district court.
- The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision.
- Eckels, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact regarding implied consent exist when a vehicle owner explicitly forbids his son from driving a specific truck, but has given permission in the past, leaves the keys in the ignition, and does not monitor the vehicle's use?
Opinions:
Majority - McFadden, J.
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact regarding implied consent exists under these circumstances. An owner's explicit prohibition against use does not automatically defeat a claim of implied consent, especially in a parent-child relationship. The court reasoned that the father-son relationship itself allows for an inference of consent. This inference is strengthened by other objective factors, including the son's prior permitted use of the vehicle, the father's practice of leaving the ignition keys in the truck, and the father's failure to take affirmative steps to ensure the vehicle was not being used against his instructions. Citing precedents like Elkinton v. California State Auto. Ass'n, the court noted that parental indifference to enforcing rules can be interpreted as tacit permission, and entrusting a child with the means to operate a vehicle (by leaving keys accessible) is sufficient to support an inference of implied consent. Therefore, these combined factors create a question of fact for a jury to resolve, making summary judgment improper.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the doctrine of implied consent in the context of owner's vicarious liability statutes. It establishes that an owner's verbal prohibition is not dispositive and can be outweighed by circumstantial evidence suggesting tacit approval. The decision empowers juries to look beyond express statements and consider the totality of the circumstances, particularly the relationship between the parties and the owner's conduct. This lowers the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in such cases, making it more difficult for owners, especially parents, to disclaim liability merely by asserting they had forbidden the use of their vehicle.
