Eastin v. Broomfield
570 P.2d 744, 116 Ariz. 576, 1977 Ariz. LEXIS 207 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A statute requiring mandatory submission of medical malpractice claims to a non-binding, pre-trial review panel whose findings are admissible as evidence in a subsequent trial does not violate constitutional rights to a jury trial or equal protection. However, a provision requiring a party who rejects the panel's decision to post a substantial cost bond before proceeding to trial is an unconstitutional violation of the right of access to the courts.
Facts:
- Keith A. Eastin and Rosemary Eastin sued Dr. William R. Gerchick, a Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.), alleging he was negligent in prescribing the drug Talwin to Keith Eastin.
- As required by a new Arizona statute, the Eastins' malpractice claim was first submitted to a medical liability review panel.
- At the panel hearing, the Eastins attempted to present expert testimony from Dr. John Palmer, a medical doctor (M.D.), regarding the appropriate standard of care for prescribing drugs.
- The panel refused to allow Dr. Palmer to testify on the grounds that he was not of the same school of medicine as Dr. Gerchick.
- During the proceedings, it was revealed that the osteopathic doctor serving on the review panel had previously been suspended from practice for unprofessional prescription of narcotic drugs.
- This panel member was excused and replaced, but the petitioners' request to begin the hearing anew with an entirely new panel was denied.
Procedural Posture:
- Keith and Rosemary Eastin filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. William Gerchick in the Superior Court (trial court).
- Pursuant to statute, the case was referred to a medical liability review panel.
- During the panel hearing, the presiding judge excluded the testimony of the Eastins' expert witness.
- After a panel member was disqualified, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court appointed a replacement rather than convening an entirely new panel.
- The Eastins (petitioners) brought a petition for special action directly to the Supreme Court of Arizona (highest court) to review these rulings and challenge the constitutionality of the entire medical malpractice act.
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Issue:
Does an Arizona statute that mandates submission of medical malpractice claims to a pre-trial review panel, allows the panel's findings to be admitted into evidence at trial, and requires a party rejecting the panel's decision to post a $2,000 bond, violate state constitutional protections for trial by jury, equal protection of the laws, and access to the courts?
Opinions:
Majority - Cameron, Chief Justice
No, with one exception. The statute mandating a pre-trial review panel is largely constitutional, but the cost bond provision is not. The requirement of a pre-trial review panel does not violate the right to a jury trial because the jury remains the final arbiter of facts, and the panel's conclusion is merely non-binding evidence akin to an expert opinion. The statute does not violate equal protection because the legislature had a rational basis for treating medical malpractice claims differently to address a perceived crisis in rising insurance costs. Similarly, the panel does not usurp judicial power as it cannot enter a final, binding judgment. However, the mandatory $2,000 bond requirement for a party who rejects the panel's decision unconstitutionally burdens the right of access to the courts for both indigent and non-indigent litigants, violating the privileges and immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution. This unconstitutional bond provision is severable, leaving the remainder of the statute intact.
Analysis:
This decision validates a common legislative tort reform measure—the pre-trial screening panel—enacted in response to the 1970s medical malpractice insurance crisis. By upholding the core of the statute, the court affirmed the legislature's power to create procedural frameworks for specific types of litigation, so long as the ultimate constitutional right to a jury trial is preserved. The ruling establishes that a panel's findings can be treated as expert evidence without supplanting the jury's role. Crucially, by striking down the cost bond provision, the court reinforced the fundamental principle that access to the justice system cannot be conditioned on a litigant's ability to pay, setting a key limitation on such legislative reforms.
