Eakin v. Raub
1825 Pa. LEXIS 28, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (1825)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A legislative act that repeals a saving clause in a statute of limitations will not be construed to have a retrospective effect that immediately bars existing claims. Such statutes are to be interpreted prospectively to avoid the injustice of instantaneously divesting a vested right of action without allowing a reasonable time to commence a suit.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs, residing in Ireland, claimed an undivided moiety (one-half interest) in four lots of land in Easton, Pennsylvania, under the will of Dr. Andrew Ledlie.
- A 1785 Pennsylvania statute of limitations required actions for land to be brought within twenty-one years but contained a saving clause that provided an extra ten years for persons 'beyond the sea' after they came into the United States.
- The Pennsylvania legislature passed a supplementary act on March 11, 1815, which repealed the saving clause for persons 'beyond the sea.'
- At the time the 1815 act was passed, the plaintiffs' right to bring an action for the land was still protected under the 1785 act's saving clause.
- The defendants, who were in possession of the land, argued that the 1815 act immediately and retroactively applied, thus barring the plaintiffs' claim the moment it was passed.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, heirs of Dr. Ledlie, brought an action of ejectment against the defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County to recover four lots of land.
- At trial, the defendants' counsel requested the court to instruct the jury on the effect of the 1815 supplement to the 1785 act of limitations.
- The trial court judge instructed the jury that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the act of limitation as amended in 1815.
- The plaintiffs excepted to the judge's opinion and instruction.
- The jury found in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the 1815 supplementary act, which repealed a saving clause protecting persons 'beyond the sea' in the 1785 statute of limitations, operate retrospectively to immediately bar the claims of such persons who possessed a right of entry before the supplement was passed?
Opinions:
Majority - Tilghman, C. J.
No, the supplementary act does not operate retrospectively to immediately bar the claim. A construction that deprives a person of a vested property right instantaneously, without any time to bring an action, is a violation of the principles of natural justice and should not be attributed to the legislature without the most clear and positive expressions. The proper construction is to interpret the 1815 supplement as incorporating the equitable principles of the original 1785 act. This means the fifteen-year grace period from the original act should be considered re-enacted for persons out of the United States, recommencing from the date of the 1815 supplement. This approach creates a system of limitation that is 'prudent, fair, and honest,' whereas the defendants' interpretation would be flagrantly unjust.
Dissenting - Gibson, J.
Yes, the act was intended to operate immediately and bar the claim. The actual intent of the legislature was to interpose an immediate bar, as shown by the simple repeal of the saving clause and the express extension of the main limitation period. The protection for absent owners was 'entirely gratuitous' and its repeal created no injustice. The main body of this opinion argues that while the judiciary can declare state laws void if they conflict with the U.S. Constitution (due to the Supremacy Clause), it has no authority to declare a state law void for being repugnant to the state constitution. The proper remedy for an unconstitutional state law is for the people to correct the abuse by instructing their representatives to repeal it, not for judges to usurp legislative power.
Concurring - Duncan, J.
No, the act is not retrospective and does not bar the claim. The repealing act of 1815 should be construed as altogether prospective, affecting only future claims and placing residents and absentees on the same footing from that day forward. A repeal of a law does not undo rights that have already vested under it; to construe the act retrospectively would be an act of 'confiscation' that takes away a vested right of action. Such an intention, which is repugnant to justice and property rights, should not be imputed to the legislature without unequivocal proof. The long history of Pennsylvania legislation shows a consistent adherence to prospective limitations that provide a reasonable time for claimants to act.
Analysis:
This case is a cornerstone of American constitutional law, primarily due to Justice Gibson's dissenting opinion, which presents the most forceful and comprehensive argument against the power of judicial review for state laws under state constitutions. It serves as the classic counterpoint to the doctrine established in Marbury v. Madison. While the majority's holding on the prospective application of statutes of limitation is a significant principle of statutory construction, Gibson's dissent distinguishing between federal and state judicial review has made the case a canonical text. His argument—that the people, not the courts, are the ultimate check on legislative power at the state level—remains a fundamental articulation of the theory of legislative supremacy.
