Eakin v. Raub
1825 Pa. LEXIS 28, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (1825)
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Rule of Law:
A statute will not be construed to apply retrospectively to instantaneously divest a vested right of action, unless the legislature's intent to do so is expressed in the most clear and positive terms.
Facts:
- Dr. Andrew Ledlie died, leaving by will an undivided moiety of four lots in Easton, Pennsylvania to the plaintiffs.
- At the time their title accrued, the plaintiffs resided in Ireland, making them persons 'beyond the sea'.
- A Pennsylvania statute of limitations passed in 1785 provided a saving clause, giving persons 'beyond the sea' an extended period of ten years after returning to the United States to bring an action to recover land.
- The defendants were in possession of the lots claimed by the plaintiffs.
- In 1815, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a supplementary act that repealed the saving clause for persons 'beyond the sea' and extended the general twenty-one-year limitation to them.
- After the passage of the 1815 act, the plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment to recover their portion of the lots.
- The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim was immediately barred by the 1815 supplementary act.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, devisees under the will of Dr. Andrew Ledlie, brought an action of ejectment against the defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (a trial court).
- At trial, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the 1815 supplement to the Pennsylvania act of limitations.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that the plaintiffs' action was, in fact, barred by the act of limitations.
- Following this instruction, a verdict was returned for the defendants.
- The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the state's highest court, alleging error in the trial court's instruction on the statutes of limitation.
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Issue:
Does a supplementary act that repeals a saving clause for persons 'beyond the sea' in a statute of limitations apply retrospectively to immediately bar the claims of such persons whose right of action had already accrued?
Opinions:
Majority - Tilghman, C.J.
No, a legislative act should not be interpreted to retrospectively destroy a vested right of action. To construe the 1815 supplementary act as an immediate bar to the plaintiffs' claim would be a violation of the principles of natural justice. Such a harsh interpretation should not be attributed to the legislature without the most clear and positive expressions of that intent. Instead, the act should be read prospectively, or at the very least, as incorporating the equitable principles of the original 1785 act, which would grant a reasonable period (such as fifteen years) for those with existing rights to bring their claims. The legislature is presumed to act fairly and honestly, and an instantaneous deprivation of a right to land is inconsistent with that presumption.
Majority - Duncan, J.
No, the 1815 act is not retrospective and does not divest the plaintiffs of their vested right to bring an action. The repeal of a saving clause affects only its future operation; it does not undo rights that have already been secured under it. A vested right is the power to do certain actions or possess things according to the law of the land, and the plaintiffs had such a right of entry and action on March 11, 1815. To construe the act as an immediate bar would be an act of confiscation, not limitation. Laws may be repealed, but rights acquired under them do not cease; no power can recall the past.
Dissenting - Gibson, J.
Yes, the 1815 act should be interpreted as an immediate bar to the plaintiffs' claim. The legislative intent to impose an immediate bar is clear from the simple repeal of the saving clause and the express extension of the standard limitation period. The previous protection for absent owners was a gratuitous privilege, not a vested right originating in a contract. More significantly, a state judiciary does not have the authority to declare an act of its own state legislature void for being repugnant to the state constitution. The legislature is sovereign within its sphere, and the ultimate check on its power is the people through the electoral process, not the courts. While courts must strike down state laws that conflict with the U.S. Constitution due to the Supremacy Clause, no such power exists to invalidate state laws based on the state constitution.
Analysis:
This case is a classic example of the judicial canon of construction against statutory retroactivity, particularly where vested rights are at stake. However, its primary legal significance lies in Justice Gibson's powerful and comprehensive dissent, which is considered the most formidable argument ever made against the doctrine of judicial review of state legislation under a state constitution, as established in Marbury v. Madison. Although Gibson's view on judicial review did not prevail and he later recanted it, his opinion remains a foundational text in the study of separation of powers and judicial authority. It forces a critical examination of the source and legitimacy of the judiciary's power to nullify the acts of a co-equal branch of government.
