Yes, this was robbery. The judges decided that by blocking the woman's path, the teenager scared her *before* he even grabbed the purse. That fear is what turns a simple theft into the more serious crime of robbery. It wasn't like a sneaky pickpocket; it was a scary confrontation.

No, this was just theft. This judge disagreed, arguing the evidence showed the woman only got scared *after* her purse was already gone. For it to be robbery, the fear has to happen before or at the same time as the stealing. Since this judge believed the fear came later, he said it was just a simple theft (larceny).

Yes, it is robbery. The lady's story shows she was scared and intimidated right before or at the same time her purse was taken because the young person and their friend blocked her path. The higher court should trust that the judge or jury believed the lady's story and made the right decision based on the facts. The higher court won't change the original decision unless there was a big mistake. But, the court needs to have a separate hearing to decide how much money the young person owes the lady, instead of letting the counselor decide.

I agree that there needs to be a hearing about paying the lady back, but I don't think what happened was actually robbery. The young person didn't use force or make the lady scared for her safety until after they took her purse. The lady said she was only shocked and scared after the purse was already taken. I think it should be considered a less serious crime, like theft, not robbery. But I also know the higher court should usually respect what the original court decided based on the facts.

***** HERE ARE THE OPINIONS. THERE ARE 2 OF THEM ***** 
*THIS IS A Majority OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b845-16">NESBITT, Judge.</author>
The appellant, pursuant to Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1977), challenges his adjudication of delinquency arising out of robbery charges filed against him. Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show that the robbery was accompanied by any force or violence. McCloud v. State, 335 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976); Mims v. State, 342 So.2d 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) (Robbery) 2.06 and 2.07.
The pertinent testimony showed that the appellant snatched a purse from the hand of the victim, an elderly woman who was walking on a sidewalk on Miami Beach. She was confronted by the defendant and his companion on the sidewalk. The victim described the scene as “a very small sidewalk, and on one side are the gates and on the right side are the cars, and I couldn’t go anywhere.” She testified that the defendant approached on the left “[a]nd this boy took my purse out of my hand [referring to the defendant]. I was scared and I couldn’t see anything, and I was in a state of shock for a moment.”
It is obvious that upon having her path blocked by the defendant and his companion, this elderly lady was intimidated at the moment of, or slightly prior to, this event. On cross-examination, the victim indicated that her state of mind described above occurred contemporaneously with the act. Under these circumstances, we find the testimony was sufficient to show that the violence or intimidation preceded or was contemporaneous with the taking. Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 (1922).
The case sub judice is similar to Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (Fla.1967) where the victim of the alleged robbery was put in fear prior to the taking of her property. In Flagler, a housewife was driving with her four-year-old son and had stopped her car at a stop sign when the defendant furtively entered her car and reached for her pocketbook. The victim first became aware of the defendant’s presence as she attempted to change gears and saw his hand reaching for her pocketbook. Justice Thomas, writing for the court, observed that:
<blockquote id="b845-21">We think that in this setting the mother would have been less than human if she had not been frightened out of her wits and that the fear was generated when she saw a strange hand reaching for her purse at about the time she became conscious of the petitioner’s presence.</blockquote>
198 So.2d at 314.
In McCloud v. State, 335 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976), Justice England, speaking for <page-number citation-index="1" label="778">*778</page-number>the court, recognized the “nice” distinctions between robbery and larceny. In the present case, these nuances became a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. In our appellate posture, we must assume that the trier of fact “believed that credible testimony most damaging to the defendant and drew from the facts established those reasonable conclusions most unfavorable to the defendant.” Parrish v. State, 97 So.2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 817 (Fla.1958). See also, Jefferson v. State, 298 So.2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Consequently, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact nor pit its judgment against those determinations of fact properly rendered by the trier of fact. State v. Smith, 249 So.2d 16 (Fla.1971). All conflicts and reasonable inferences therefrom are resolved to support the judgment of conviction. Wooten v. State, 361 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Dawson v. State, 338 So.2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Starling v. State, 263 So.2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 268 So.2d 905 (Fla.1972).
Next, the appellant asserts the trial court erred in delegating authority to his counsel- or to fix restitution. The dispositional order of this court provided: “Further, said child is to pay a proportionate restitution to the victim in the amount deemed appropriate by his counselor.”
In Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla.1977), our Supreme Court held that, prior to restitution being ordered, a defendant must be given notice of the proposed restitution order as well as an opportunity to be heard as to the amount. Additionally, the authority to determine the amount cannot be delegated to the probationer’s supervisor. McClure v, State, 371 So.2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Kroenke v. State, 366 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So.2d 99 (Fla.1979).
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s adjudication of delinquency is affirmed; the order delegating judicial authority to the juvenile’s counselor to determine the amount of restitution is reversed with directions to afford the juvenile an evidentiary hearing as to the amount of restitution prior to any adjudication by the court.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Majority OPINION ***THIS IS A Concurrence Opinion OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">
<author id="b846-9">BASKIN, Judge</author>
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the opinion insofar as it pertains to the question of restitution. I respectfully dissent, however, from the determination that the offense for which defendant was adjudicated delinquent was proved to be robbery.
In my view, the principle reiterated in McCloud v. State, 335 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976), applies: “Where no force is exerted upon the victim’s person, as in the case of a pickpocket, only a larceny is committed.” In the case at bar, defendant neither exerted force before or during the taking, nor induced the victim to fear for her physical safety. Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, 159 (1922). The victim did not become frightened until after the taking, according to her response on cross-examination:
<blockquote id="b846-12">Q: The first time that you realized anything was happening was after they took your purse?</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b846-13">A: Right, I was in shock. And then I screamed.</blockquote>
“Picking a pocket or purse snatching is not robbery if no more force or violence is used than is necessary to physically remove the property from a person who does not resist. But if the victim resists in any degree and this resistance is overcome by the physical force of the offender, the crime of robbery is complete.” Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) (Robbery) 2.07.
For these reasons, I would reduce the adjudication of delinquency for robbery to an adjudication of delinquency for petit larceny.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Concurrence Opinion OPINION ******* END OF ALL OPINIONS FOR THIS CASE *****

In our appellate posture, we must assume that the trier of fact "believed that credible testimony most damaging to the defendant and drew from the facts established those reasonable conclusions most unfavorable to the defendant."

—district court will not substitute its judgment for that of trier of fact nor pit its judgment against determinations of fact properly rendered by trier of fact

The state having confessed error, the order delegating judicial authority to the juvenile's counselor to determine the amount of restitution is reversed with directions to afford the juvenile an evidentiary hearing as to the amount of restitution prior to any adjudication by the court.

The majority is disdainful of and declines to follow existing Florida law requiring that precedent or contemporaneous force or fear be established to prove the crime of robbery.

In considering Blair's contention we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Therefore we remand the cause with instructions to held an evidentiary hearing as to the amount of restitution to be made.

It is well settled law that determinations as to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and evidentiary findings and conclusions are exclusively the duty of the trial judge as the trier of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its opinion of the facts or re-weigh the evidence and reach a conclusion different from that of the trial judge.

The statement in the petitioner's merits brief (PB 1) l that "the defendant offered to sell the stolen pistol to Leroy Fisher" should stand because'l [a] ll conflicts and reasonable inferences therefrom are resolved to support the judgment of conviction. "EY u.

We have carefully considered appellant's contentions in the light of the record and briefs and have concluded that reversible error has not been shown.

And "if the victim resists in any degree and this resistance is overcome by the physical force of the offender, the crime of robbery is complete."

Yes. The evidence was sufficient to show that the robbery was accompanied by force or intimidation. The act of the appellant and his companion blocking the elderly victim's path on a narrow sidewalk was an intimidating act that occurred immediately prior to or contemporaneously with the snatching of the purse. This intimidation satisfies the 'force or fear' element required for robbery, distinguishing the crime from a simple larceny or pickpocketing. The court defers to the trier of fact's reasonable conclusion that the victim was put in fear by the confrontational circumstances preceding the actual taking of her property.

No. The offense was not proven to be robbery because the victim's fear occurred after the taking, not before or during. Citing the victim's cross-examination testimony that she realized what was happening 'after they took [her] purse,' the dissent argues that no force beyond that necessary for the physical removal of the purse was used. Without force or fear preceding or contemporaneous with the taking, the crime is merely petit larceny, not robbery.

Yes. The testimony was sufficient to show that the violence or intimidation preceded or was contemporaneous with the taking of the purse because the victim's path was blocked by the appellant and his companion, and she was intimidated at the moment of, or slightly prior to, the purse snatching. As an appellate court, we must assume that the trier of fact believed the most damaging testimony to the defendant and drew reasonable conclusions against the defendant. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact or re-evaluate determinations of fact properly rendered by the trier of fact. All conflicts and reasonable inferences are resolved to support the judgment of conviction. However, the portion of the order delegating authority to the appellant's counselor to determine the amount of restitution is reversed. The appellant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the proposed restitution amount at an evidentiary hearing before the court prior to any adjudication of the restitution amount.

I concur with the majority opinion regarding the issue of restitution but respectfully dissent from the determination that the offense was proved to be robbery. In my view, the appellant did not exert force or induce fear in the victim for her physical safety before or during the taking of the purse. According to the victim's testimony on cross-examination, she did not become frightened until after the taking occurred. Purse snatching is not robbery if no more force is used than necessary to physically remove the property from a person who does not resist. I would reduce the adjudication of delinquency for robbery to an adjudication of delinquency for petit larceny. However, I acknowledge the limited role of the appellate court in re-evaluating the evidence and findings of the trier of fact.

E. Y. v. State

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