EI du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson
923 S.W.2d 549 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702, scientific expert testimony is admissible only if the proponent shows that the testimony is both relevant to the issues in the case and based upon a reliable scientific foundation.
Facts:
- C.R. and Shirley Robinson owned a pecan orchard.
- The Robinsons applied Benlate 50 DF, a fungicide manufactured by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), to their pecan trees.
- Subsequently, the Robinsons' pecan trees showed signs of damage.
- The Robinsons hired Dr. Carl Whitcomb, a horticulturist, as an expert witness to determine the cause of the damage.
- Dr. Whitcomb visually inspected the orchard for approximately two and a quarter hours but did not conduct any soil tests, tissue tests, or tests on the Robinsons' remaining sample of Benlate.
- Dr. Whitcomb concluded that the Robinsons' Benlate was contaminated with sulfonylurea (SU) herbicides, basing this opinion on a method he called 'comparative symptomology'—comparing the trees' symptoms to other plants allegedly damaged by Benlate.
- Dr. Whitcomb did not rule out other potential causes for the damage, such as root rot or weather conditions, which he admitted could cause similar symptoms.
- Dr. Whitcomb's research and experiments supporting his opinion were conducted at the request of attorneys for the purpose of litigation.
Procedural Posture:
- C.R. and Shirley Robinson sued E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) in a Texas trial court.
- DuPont filed a pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of the Robinsons' causation expert, Dr. Carl Whitcomb.
- After a hearing, the trial court granted DuPont's motion, finding Dr. Whitcomb's opinions were not scientifically reliable.
- The case proceeded to a nonjury trial, where the court again excluded the testimony and granted a directed verdict in favor of DuPont.
- The Robinsons, as appellants, appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that once an expert is qualified, the jury should determine the weight and credibility of the testimony.
- DuPont, as petitioner, appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 require a trial court to determine that proffered scientific expert testimony is scientifically reliable, in addition to being relevant and offered by a qualified witness, before it can be admitted into evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Gonzalez, J.
Yes. In addition to assessing an expert's qualifications, Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 requires a trial court to act as a gatekeeper and ensure that proffered scientific expert testimony is both relevant to the case and rests on a reliable scientific foundation. The court adopts the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, holding that for scientific testimony to be admissible 'scientific knowledge,' it must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science, not merely subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The court found Dr. Whitcomb's testimony unreliable because his methodology was flawed; specifically, he failed to test for and exclude other possible causes for the damage, his 'comparative symptomology' theory was not subjected to peer review and was not shown to be generally accepted in the scientific community, and his research was conducted solely for litigation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding his testimony.
Dissenting - Cornyn, J.
No. The majority's adoption of a 'reliability' standard is unworkable, as it improperly requires trial judges untrained in science to act as 'amateur scientists' and invades the jury's province of determining witness credibility and the weight of testimony. The proper inquiry should be under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703, which permits expert opinion based on firsthand observation or on facts and data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field. Dr. Whitcomb's testimony should have been admitted because it was based in part on his firsthand, personal observation of the Robinsons' orchard, which is an independently sufficient basis. Furthermore, DuPont failed to present any controverting evidence to show that Dr. Whitcomb's methods were not of a type reasonably relied upon by other horticulturists.
Analysis:
This landmark decision officially imported the Daubert standard into Texas civil jurisprudence, fundamentally altering the standard for admissibility of scientific expert testimony. By requiring trial judges to act as 'gatekeepers' who must scrutinize the reliability of an expert's methodology, the ruling significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs in complex litigation like toxic tort and products liability cases. The decision shifted the focus from an expert's credentials to the scientific validity of their underlying principles, making it more difficult to introduce novel or 'junk science' theories to a jury. This case established a robust framework for challenging expert evidence, profoundly influencing pretrial strategy and the outcomes of scientific-based disputes in Texas.
Unlock the full brief for EI du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson