Dyer v. Dyer
566 S.E.2d 665, 275 Ga. 339 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A provision in a will that purports to grant an interest in land but contains no limitations as to time, place, or manner, is void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation if it is repugnant to the fee simple estate otherwise granted.
Facts:
- Worth and Emma Linda Dyer executed a joint will in 1981.
- Item Four of the will devised their 'farm and homeplace' to their son, Sonny Dyer, upon the death of the surviving parent.
- Item Four also gave their daughter, Shirley Dyer, the right to live at the homeplace for her lifetime.
- Item Five of the will stated, 'In the event any of our sons should wish to build a house on the property bequeathed to Sonny Dyer in Item Four hereof, they shall have the right to do so.'
- Worth Dyer died in 1981, and Emma Linda Dyer died in 1999, leaving Sonny and their other son Roger as co-executors.
- The real property at issue consists of three tracts, including a 65.34-acre 'farm' and a smaller 'homeplace' with a brick home.
Procedural Posture:
- Roger Dyer, as co-executor, filed a 'Petition for the Construction of a Will' in the Superior Court of Union County (trial court).
- The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and entered an order interpreting the will.
- The court ruled that Sonny Dyer held fee simple title to the farm and homeplace (subject to his sister's life estate), that the restriction on sale to male heirs was void, and that the language in Item Five about building a house was merely an expression of desire (precatory) and created no property interest.
- The trial court also established a right of first refusal for the Dyer sons should Sonny decide to sell the property.
- Roger Dyer (appellant) appealed the superior court's order to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
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Issue:
Does a provision in a will granting sons the right to build a house on property devised in fee simple to another son, without any limitation as to time, place, or manner, create a legally enforceable interest in the land?
Opinions:
Majority - Hines, Justice
No. The provision granting sons the right to build a house does not create a legally enforceable interest because it is an unreasonable restraint on alienation repugnant to the fee simple estate granted to Sonny Dyer. The court reasons that an expressed devise in fee simple cannot be diminished by a subsequent, ambiguous provision. Even if the language in Item Five were interpreted as an attempt to create an easement in gross, it would be unenforceable. The purported easement contains no limitations whatsoever regarding time, place, or manner, which would give the sons a perpetual right to build any kind of house anywhere on the land. This unlimited right would act as a complete restraint on Sonny's ability to alienate (sell or transfer) the property, making it repugnant to the fee simple estate granted to him in Item Four. Under Georgia law (OCGA § 44-6-43) and established precedent, a condition which is repugnant to a granted estate is void, as public policy strongly favors the free alienability of property.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong public policy against unreasonable restraints on alienation. It clarifies that courts will void will provisions that, while facially granting a right, are so vague and unlimited that they effectively destroy the value and transferability of the underlying estate. The case establishes that a purported interest, such as an easement, lacking any defined limits on time, place, or manner will be struck down as repugnant to a fee simple devise. This protects property owners from uncertain and perpetual burdens that would otherwise cloud title and render property unmarketable, reinforcing the principle that a clear grant of ownership will not be defeated by a subsequent, ambiguous, and overly restrictive condition.

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