Duron v. Albertson's LLC
2009 WL 376837, 560 F.3d 288 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff's sworn affidavit denying receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding its receipt, thereby rebutting the common law mailbox rule's presumption of receipt and precluding summary judgment on the basis of untimeliness.
Facts:
- Margarita Duron filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her employer, Albertson's LLC, alleging discrimination based on her Hispanic national origin.
- Albertson's subsequently terminated Duron's employment.
- Duron then filed a second charge with the EEOC, alleging her termination was in retaliation for her initial discrimination charge.
- The EEOC issued a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" letter, which stated a mailing date of October 4, 2004, and informed Duron she had 90 days from receipt to file a lawsuit.
- Duron stated in a sworn affidavit that she never received this notice.
- Between late 2004 and mid-2006, Duron and her attorney made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the EEOC to inquire about the status of her case.
- On August 24, 2006, Duron's attorney received a copy of the October 4, 2004 right-to-sue letter for the first time after writing and delivering a letter to the EEOC's regional attorney.
Procedural Posture:
- Margarita Duron filed a lawsuit against Albertson’s LLC in federal district court, alleging violations of Title VII.
- Albertson's filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Duron's lawsuit was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the EEOC allegedly mailed her right-to-sue letter.
- The district court granted Albertson's motion for summary judgment, holding that Duron's affidavit was insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the presumption that she had received the letter.
- Duron, as the appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with Albertson's as the appellee.
- The EEOC submitted an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in support of Duron's position.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a plaintiff's sworn affidavit denying receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter sufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt under the mailbox rule and survive summary judgment when the defendant provides no evidence of mailing other than the dated letter itself?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. A plaintiff's sworn affidavit denying receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding receipt, precluding summary judgment. The court reasoned that the mailbox rule only creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt, which comes into play only when receipt is in dispute. Citing its precedent in Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., the court emphasized that the threshold question is whether there is sufficient evidence the letter was actually mailed. Here, Albertson's only evidence of mailing was a copy of the EEOC notice with a date typed on it; it produced no business records, affidavits, or even evidence that its own copy was received. In contrast, Duron provided a sworn affidavit of non-receipt and evidence of her and her attorney's diligence in attempting to contact the EEOC. This conflicting evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the notice was ever mailed or received, making summary judgment for Albertson's improper.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces that the mailbox rule's presumption of receipt is not absolute and can be overcome by credible evidence of non-receipt at the summary judgment stage. It clarifies that a plaintiff's sworn affidavit is not, as a matter of law, insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. The ruling places a practical evidentiary burden on defendants relying on a timeliness defense to produce more than just a dated copy of a right-to-sue letter, especially when they cannot prove their own receipt of a courtesy copy. This protects Title VII plaintiffs from having their cases dismissed on a procedural technicality where there is a legitimate dispute over whether they ever received notice that the 90-day filing clock had started.
