Duren v. Missouri
439 U.S. 357 (1979)
Rule of Law:
A state law granting women an automatic exemption from jury service upon request violates a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community if it results in the systematic and significant underrepresentation of women on jury venires.
Facts:
- Billy Duren was indicted for first-degree murder and robbery in Jackson County, Missouri.
- Missouri law and the state constitution provided an automatic exemption from jury service for any woman who requested it.
- In Jackson County, jury selection questionnaires were mailed to registered voters, which included a prominent section for women to easily claim this exemption without stating a reason.
- A summons for jury duty also advised women they could claim the exemption by mail, and women who simply failed to appear for service were treated as having claimed it.
- According to the 1970 census, women comprised 54% of the adult population in Jackson County.
- During the period Duren's jury was chosen, women comprised 26.7% of those summoned for jury duty, but only 14.5% of the people who actually appeared for service on the weekly venires.
- Duren's own 53-person jury panel, from which his trial jury was selected, included only 5 women.
- The 12 jurors ultimately selected for Duren's trial were all men.
Procedural Posture:
- Billy Duren was indicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, a state trial court.
- Duren filed a pretrial motion to quash his jury panel, arguing Missouri's automatic jury exemption for women violated his fair-cross-section rights.
- The trial court denied the motion, and Duren was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery.
- Duren's post-conviction motion for a new trial on the same grounds was also denied.
- Duren, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Missouri Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
- The Missouri Supreme Court, with the State of Missouri as appellee, affirmed the conviction, finding the jury venires were within constitutional standards.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Duren's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state law that grants women an automatic exemption from jury service upon request, resulting in jury venires averaging less than 15% female in a community where women constitute 54% of the population, violate a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
Yes. A state law granting women an automatic exemption from jury service upon request, which results in significant underrepresentation of women on jury venires, violates a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. To establish a prima facie violation, a defendant must show: (1) the excluded group is 'distinctive' in the community; (2) the group's representation in venires is not fair and reasonable compared to their proportion in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. Here, women are a distinctive group. The gross discrepancy between women being 54% of the community and 15% of the venires is not fair and reasonable. This underrepresentation was systematic, resulting directly from Missouri's opt-out exemption system. Once a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the state to show that a 'significant state interest' is 'manifestly and primarily advanced' by the exemption. Missouri's justification—safeguarding women's role in the home and family life—is an insufficient, overbroad stereotype that cannot justify the infringement on the fair-cross-section right.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No. The Missouri jury selection system, which results in underrepresentation but not total exclusion of women, does not violate the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement. The majority improperly melds Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section analysis with Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles. This case is different from Taylor v. Louisiana, where the system resulted in near-total exclusion. Here, women were merely underrepresented at 15%, which is not 'exclusion.' The Court's decision creates a 'constitutional numbers game,' forcing states to eliminate all gender-based or even occupation-based exemptions to avoid litigation, creating significant administrative burdens. This ruling vindicates the equal protection rights of women to serve on juries by irrationally overturning the concededly fair conviction of a murderer, which is not the proper remedy.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies and clarifies the three-part test for establishing a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement, building upon Taylor v. Louisiana. It establishes that an 'opt-out' system for a distinctive group, not just an 'opt-in' system, is unconstitutional if it results in systematic underrepresentation. The case is significant for establishing a burden-shifting framework: once the defendant proves the three elements, the state must justify the practice by showing it serves a 'significant state interest,' a standard more demanding than rational basis review. This ruling effectively invalidated automatic gender-based jury exemptions across the country and pushed states toward creating more narrowly tailored, gender-neutral criteria for jury service.
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