Dunphy v. Gregor
642 A.2d 372, 62 U.S.L.W. 2797, 136 N.J. 99 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
In New Jersey, a person may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander if they had an intimate familial relationship with the victim, which is not limited to legal marriage or blood ties but includes relationships that are stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive.
Facts:
- Eileen Dunphy and Michael T. Burwell became engaged in April 1988 and began cohabitating two months later.
- The couple set their wedding date for February 29, 1992.
- On September 29, 1990, while assisting a friend with a flat tire on Route 80 in Mount Arlington, Michael Burwell was struck by a car driven by James Gregor.
- Eileen Dunphy, standing approximately five feet from Michael, witnessed the impact, immediately ran to him, and attempted to aid him by clearing pebbles and blood from his mouth and comforting him.
- Michael Burwell died the following day as a result of his injuries.
- Since the accident, Eileen Dunphy has undergone psychiatric and psychological treatment for depression and anxiety.
- Eileen and Michael had taken out life-insurance policies making each other beneficiaries, maintained a joint checking account from which they paid bills, and jointly purchased an automobile.
- Michael had several times asked Eileen to elope with him and had introduced her in public as his wife.
Procedural Posture:
- Eileen Dunphy instituted an action in the trial court seeking damages for mental anguish, pain, and suffering as a result of witnessing Michael Burwell's death.
- The trial court ruled that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress was not available to Eileen Dunphy because she was neither married to nor involved in an intimate familial relationship with Michael Burwell.
- Eileen Dunphy appealed the trial court's decision to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division ruled that a jury should be allowed to determine whether the relationship of cohabitants engaged to be married was the functional equivalent of an intimate familial relationship, thereby reversing the trial court's ruling.
- A dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division expressed the view that only persons legally married would be entitled to such a cause of action.
- The case came before the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a matter of right due to the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Does bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress extend to a claimant who was not legally married to the deceased victim but cohabitated with and was engaged to marry the victim, thus having an "intimate familial relationship"?
Opinions:
Majority - Handler, J.
Yes, bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress extends to a claimant who was not legally married but shared a stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive intimate familial relationship, such as an engaged cohabitant, with the deceased victim. The Court applied the four-factor test from Portee v. Jaffee (84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980)), focusing on the "marital or intimate, familial relationship" prong. It rejected a "bright line" rule limiting recovery to married or blood-related individuals, as adopted by California in Elden v. Sheldon, noting that New Jersey's experience with bystander liability has been more restrictive and has not seen the same expansive application as California's post-Dillon period. The Court emphasized that the imposition of a duty of care depends on foreseeability, limited by public policy and fairness. It found that an engaged cohabitant in a deep, lasting, and genuinely intimate relationship represents an eminently foreseeable and discrete class of plaintiffs. The other Portee elements (contemporaneous observation, death or serious injury, severe emotional distress) further narrow the class. The Court reasoned that courts are capable of assessing the quality of interpersonal relationships, as they do in other contexts like loss of consortium or equitable distribution for unmarried couples (e.g., Crowe v. De Gioia, Kozlowski v. Kozlowski). It rejected arguments that allowing such claims would lead to fraudulent claims, intrude on privacy (as inquiries into relationships occur even in married contexts), subvert the state's interest in promoting marriage, or significantly increase insurance premiums. The Court concluded that its view comports with other jurisdictions that focus on the nature and integrity of the relationship rather than strict blood ties.
Dissenting - Garibaldi, J.
No, bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress should not extend to an unmarried cohabitant, even if engaged, because such an expansion lacks a sufficiently limiting principle and contradicts public policy that distinguishes between married and unmarried persons. Justice Garibaldi argued that while an unmarried cohabitant may suffer severe emotional distress, the court must draw clear, arbitrary lines to limit tort liability, especially for emotional injuries, which are hard to define and have a virtually limitless number of potential claimants. She noted that Portee itself imposed arbitrary limits, such as requiring actual presence at the accident. The dissent agreed with California's Elden decision, which rejected expanding recovery to cohabitants to avoid "unlimited liability" and an "intolerable burden on society." The dissent believed Portee's "marital or intimate familial relationship" clause was meant to be restricted to marriage or blood ties, as most prior cases had interpreted it. Public policy, as reflected in New Jersey statutes (e.g., abolition of common-law marriage, intestate succession, wrongful death, alimony, loss of consortium), consistently treats unmarried cohabitants differently from spouses, and extending bystander liability would contradict these legal distinctions. Furthermore, the majority's "unworkable and ultimately unwise" standard would require intrusive and expensive investigations into the intimate details of relationships, which would be speculative and disadvantage defendants, as often only the surviving claimant would be available to testify.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the scope of the "intimate familial relationship" requirement in bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in New Jersey. By moving beyond a "bright line" rule based on legal marriage or blood, the Court signals a willingness to adapt tort law to evolving social realities, emphasizing the functional quality of a relationship over its formal legal status. This approach allows for greater individualized justice but introduces complexity in evidentiary requirements, as juries must now evaluate the depth and stability of a relationship using multi-faceted criteria. Future cases will likely refine the factors used to define "stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive" relationships, potentially impacting claims involving other non-traditional family structures or deeply committed friendships.
