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Dunn v. Teti

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
1980 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2987, 421 A.2d 782, 280 Pa. Super. 399 (1980)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

In Pennsylvania, minors under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be incapable of actionable negligence.


Facts:

  • The minor-defendant was five years and seven months old.
  • The minor-plaintiff was six years and two weeks old.
  • The minor-defendant was swinging a wooden stick.
  • The stick swung by the minor-defendant struck and injured the minor-plaintiff.

Procedural Posture:

  • The appellants (plaintiffs) filed a complaint in trespass in the court of common pleas (trial court) against the appellees (defendants).
  • Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
  • The court of common pleas en banc granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment.
  • Appellants appealed the trial court's order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (intermediate appellate court).

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Issue:

Is a minor under the age of seven conclusively presumed to be incapable of actionable negligence?


Opinions:

Majority - Price, Judge

Yes, a minor under the age of seven is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence. The court extends the well-established three-tiered age presumption, originally used for contributory negligence and derived from common law criminal responsibility, to cases of primary negligence. This framework establishes that (1) minors under seven are conclusively incapable of negligence, (2) minors between seven and fourteen are rebuttably presumed incapable, and (3) minors over fourteen are presumptively capable. The court reasoned that applying a different standard for primary negligence versus contributory negligence would be illogical, as a child's immaturity is the same regardless of whether they are a plaintiff or a defendant. A bright-line rule is necessary for consistency and expediency, preventing juries from applying a 'shifting standard' based on sympathy.


Dissenting - Cavanaugh, Judge

No, a conclusive presumption is inappropriate for a child of five years and seven months; instead, a jury should determine negligence based on the standard of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience. The dissent advocates for the flexible standard found in the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 283A, which allows for a case-by-case analysis. It argues that a rigid, arbitrary age rule fails to account for the varying capacities of children. In this case, a jury should have been permitted to decide whether the defendant-child's action of swinging a wooden stick constituted negligence for a child of his specific age and development.



Analysis:

This decision solidifies the application of the 'Rule of Sevens' to primary negligence cases in Pennsylvania, extending a doctrine traditionally used for contributory negligence. By establishing a conclusive presumption of incapacity for children under seven, the court prioritizes a bright-line, predictable rule over a flexible, fact-intensive standard. This ruling creates legal certainty for courts and potential litigants but effectively bars recovery for injuries caused by very young children, regardless of the individual child's maturity or the specific circumstances of the act.

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