Dunn v. Blumstein
405 U.S. 330 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
State laws that impose durational residency requirements on voting are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because they burden the fundamental right to vote and penalize the fundamental right to interstate travel. To be constitutional, such requirements must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Facts:
- On June 12, 1970, James Blumstein moved to Tennessee to begin a job as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville.
- Blumstein established himself as a bona fide resident of the state and county.
- On July 1, 1970, Blumstein attempted to register to vote in the upcoming August and November elections.
- The county registrar refused to register Blumstein because he did not meet Tennessee's durational residency requirements, which mandated living in the state for one year and the county for three months prior to an election.
Procedural Posture:
- James Blumstein filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against various Tennessee public officials.
- The suit sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the enforcement of the state's durational residency requirements for voting.
- A three-judge district court was convened to hear the case.
- The district court concluded that Tennessee's durational residency requirements were unconstitutional.
- The Tennessee public officials (appellants) filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Do Tennessee's durational residency requirements of one year in the state and three months in the county for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. Tennessee's durational residency requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause. These requirements create a classification that burdens two fundamental rights: the right to vote and the right to travel. Therefore, the law must be judged by the strict scrutiny standard, meaning it must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Tennessee asserted two interests: 1) preventing voter fraud and 2) ensuring a knowledgeable electorate. The Court found that these interests, while legitimate, were not compelling enough to justify the lengthy residency requirements, and that the requirements were not narrowly tailored to achieve these goals. The state has less restrictive means, such as voter registration systems and criminal penalties, to prevent fraud, and the Court rejected the premise that new residents are inherently less knowledgeable or have less of a stake in the community's governance.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No. Tennessee's durational residency requirements do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. States have a legitimate power to set reasonable qualifications for voting. Requiring newcomers to reside in the state for a reasonable period, such as one year, to become familiar with local issues is a valid exercise of this power, akin to setting a minimum age for voting. Applying the 'compelling state interest' standard to such lines condemns all reasonable state regulations, as the standard demands a level of perfection that is virtually unattainable.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Blackmun
Yes. While concurring in the result that the one-year and three-month requirements should be struck down, this opinion expresses reservations. The majority's application of the compelling state interest test effectively overrules prior precedent like Pope v. Williams. The state does have a profound interest in the purity of the ballot box and an informed electorate. While the specific durations here are not sufficiently related to that interest, the majority's reasoning is couched in absolute terms, creating uncertainty about what shorter, potentially reasonable, waiting period might be permissible in the future.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the application of strict scrutiny to durational residency requirements for voting, leading to the invalidation of long waiting periods across the United States. By linking the right to vote with the right to travel, the Court established that any law imposing a significant penalty on interstate migration, such as the temporary denial of the franchise, must survive the highest level of constitutional review. The ruling significantly lowered barriers for new residents to participate in state and local elections, effectively setting a precedent that would lead to much shorter residency requirements (typically 30 days) becoming the constitutional norm.
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