Duncan v. Walker
533 U.S. 167, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
An application for federal habeas corpus review is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, a pending federal habeas petition does not toll the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Facts:
- In June 1992, Sherman Walker was convicted of robbery in a New York state court.
- Walker's state conviction became final in April 1996, shortly before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and its one-year statute of limitations became effective on April 24, 1996.
- On April 10, 1996, Walker filed his first petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus.
- This initial federal petition contained claims for which Walker had not yet exhausted his available remedies in state court.
- On May 20, 1997, after his first federal petition had been dismissed and more than one year after AEDPA's effective date, Walker filed a second federal habeas corpus petition.
Procedural Posture:
- Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.
- Walker later filed a second federal habeas petition in the same District Court.
- The District Court dismissed the second petition as time-barred under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations.
- Walker, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit, with Artuz (the warden) as appellee, reversed the District Court, holding that the pendency of the first federal petition tolled the statute of limitations.
- The government official (Duncan, the new warden), as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does an application for federal habeas corpus review constitute an 'application for State post-conviction or other collateral review' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thereby tolling AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
No. An application for federal habeas corpus review is not an 'application for State post-conviction or other collateral review' and therefore does not toll the one-year limitations period. The text of § 2244(d)(2) explicitly qualifies the review that triggers tolling as 'State' review. To interpret 'other collateral review' as including federal proceedings would render the word 'State' superfluous, violating a cardinal principle of statutory construction. Other sections of AEDPA demonstrate that when Congress intended to refer to both state and federal proceedings, it used both words explicitly; its omission of 'Federal' here is presumed to be intentional. Furthermore, this interpretation aligns with AEDPA's purpose to promote comity, finality, and federalism by incentivizing prisoners to fully exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief, rather than filing premature federal petitions.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The phrase 'other collateral review' should be interpreted to include federal habeas proceedings to avoid an unfair and likely unintended result. The statute's language is ambiguous, and canons of construction do not resolve it. The majority's interpretation creates a trap for unwary, often pro se, prisoners whose timely-filed federal petitions are dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies only after the one-year limitations period has expired, thereby denying them federal review due to procedural technicalities and the variable speed of district courts. A contrary reading, which would toll the statute during the pendency of a federal petition, would prevent this random unfairness without undermining the goals of AEDPA, as petitioners already have strong incentives to exhaust state remedies.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No. The majority's textual interpretation that the statute refers only to 'State' review is correct. However, this statutory holding does not eliminate the equitable powers of federal courts to mitigate potential injustice. A district court is not required to dismiss a mixed petition containing unexhausted claims; it may instead stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust claims. Additionally, today's decision does not preclude a federal court from applying equitable tolling to the limitations period in a case where a petitioner reasonably relied on the pendency of a timely-filed federal petition.
Concurring - Justice Souter
No. I join the Court's opinion in full but also join Justice Stevens's separate opinion to emphasize that district courts may retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion of state remedies and that equitable tolling remains a potential remedy on different facts.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split on a critical procedural question under AEDPA, reinforcing the statute's goals of finality and comity. By adopting a strict textualist reading of 'State,' the Court created a strong incentive for petitioners to fully exhaust all state remedies before filing for federal habeas relief. The holding raised significant practical concerns about creating a 'trap for the unwary' who might file a mixed petition near the end of the one-year deadline. However, Justice Stevens's concurrence proved highly influential, popularizing the 'stay-and-abeyance' procedure that allows district courts to pause a federal case while a petitioner exhausts state remedies, thus mitigating the harshness of the majority's bright-line rule.
