No, the lower courts were partly right but partly wrong. The railroad was definitely at fault because it knew the crossing was dangerous with the overgrown bushes and did nothing to fix it. However, the van driver was also very much at fault for not stopping and making sure the tracks were clear. The court decided the driver was actually more to blame, so it flipped the fault to 67% for the driver and 33% for the railroad. The court also said the money awarded was too high. The $17 million for Rachel's future medical care was based on her living to 81, which isn't realistic for someone with her injuries. Based on better medical facts, the court said she would likely live to 57 and lowered the medical award to about $10.5 million. It also reduced the $8 million award for her pain and suffering to $6 million.

One judge agreed with the final decision but said that he personally wouldn't have blamed the railroad at all. However, since an appeals court isn't supposed to second-guess a jury unless its decision is obviously wrong, he went along with finding the railroad partially at fault.

One judge disagreed with changing the blame and lowering the pain-and-suffering money. She argued that the big railroad company knew about the danger for a long time and ignored it, which was worse than the driver making a mistake. She thought the jury was right to blame the railroad more and that the original $8 million for Rachel's terrible suffering was fair and shouldn't have been cut.

Yes, KCS messed up because it didn't keep the area clear so drivers could see trains coming. It also didn't put up enough warning signs. It doesn't matter that the federal government might have paid for the signs because there's no clear proof they did for this exact crossing. I think the jury was wrong to say KCS was more at fault than Mitchell. I would say Mitchell was about 67% at fault and KCS was about 33% at fault. The money given to Rachel and her parents for their pain was okay. But the $17 million for Rachel's future medical bills was way too much because it assumed she would live to 81. Evidence shows she'll probably live to 57, so I would give $10.5 million instead.

I agree with the end result. If I were the jury, I might not have blamed KCS at all. But looking at all the facts, I can't say for sure the jury was totally wrong to do so.

I agree the jury messed up in thinking Rachel would live to 81. That means less money for her future medical care. But I disagree with changing the amounts for Rachel's pain and suffering or how much fault KCS and Mitchell each have. The majority didn't look at all the facts right to see KCS was way more in the wrong than Mitchell. They also didn't think about how badly this hurt Rachel as a young girl. Instead, they compared it to a case that's really different.

General damages are those which may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude; instead, they involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of intellectual gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style which cannot be definitely measured in monetary terms.

This Court has previously addressed the allocation of fault and the standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing such determinations.

Only after a determination that the trier of fact has abused its "much discretion" is a resort to prior awards appropriate and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.

The trier of fact is owed some deference in allocation of fault since the finding of percentages of fault is a factual determination.

The trier of fact is accorded vast discretion in fixing general damage awards, such that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.

Moreover, "[f] uture medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. Awards will not be made in the absence of medical testimony that they are indicated and setting out their probable cost."

General damages are those which are inherently speculative in nature and cannot be fixed with mathematical certainty.

The supreme court has additionally explained that a trier of fact is owed a degree of deference in its allocation of fault as a finding of a percentage of fault is a factual determination.

A] n appellate court should only disturb the trier of fact's allocation of fault when it is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous

Yes, the lower courts committed manifest error in the apportionment of fault and in the calculation of future medical and general damages. While the finding of liability against the railroad was reasonable, the fault allocation and certain damage awards were not. The court affirmed KCS's liability because, despite complying with statutory signage, KCS had a duty to mitigate the known 'unique and local safety hazard' created by the obstructed sight lines, about which it had received complaints. However, the trial court's allocation of 68.94% fault to KCS was clearly wrong; applying the Watson factors, the court found the van driver's failure to stop and yield was at least as significant as the railroad's negligence, and reallocated fault to 66.67% for the driver (Mitchell) and 33.33% for KCS. The $17 million award for future medical expenses was manifestly erroneous because it was based on a scientifically unsupported life expectancy of 81 years for a person with Rachel's injuries; the court reduced the award to $10,528,722 based on a more realistic 57-year life expectancy. The court also found the $8 million general damage award excessive and reduced it to the highest reasonable amount, $6 million.

The author concurs in the result. While he would not have found KCS liable if he were the trier of fact, he cannot say the jury's finding of partial fault was manifest error based on the record, and therefore agrees with the outcome.

The author concurs with reducing the future medical award based on the more accurate life expectancy but dissents from the reapportionment of fault and the reduction of general damages. The dissent argues that the jury's original fault allocation was reasonable given KCS's superior capacity and 'callous disregard' for a known danger, compared to the driver's inadvertent negligence. It also argues that the $8 million general damage award was not an abuse of discretion for this particular plaintiff's catastrophic injuries and should not have been reduced by comparing it to a dissimilar, older case.

Yes, KCS breached its duty because it failed to maintain adequate sight distances at the crossing and did not install sufficient warning devices, despite the crossing's unique hazards. The state law negligence claims are not preempted by federal law because there was no unequivocal evidence that federal funds were used to install or replace the warning devices at the specific crossing in question. I find that the jury's allocation of fault was clearly wrong, as KCS was no more at fault than Mitchell. I would increase Mitchell's fault to 66.67% and reduce KCS's fault to 33.33%. The general damage awards to Rachel Duncan and her parents were within the jury's vast discretion and should not be disturbed. However, the $17 million award for Rachel's future medical expenses was manifestly erroneous, as it was based on an inaccurate 81-year life expectancy. Considering the preponderance of evidence indicating a 57-year life expectancy, I would reduce the future medical expenses award to $10,528,722.

I concur in the result. While I may not have found liability on the part of KCS as the trier of fact, I cannot say the jury committed manifest error based on the record in this case.

I concur in the majority's conclusion that the jury manifestly erred in finding Rachel's life expectancy was 81 years, necessitating a reduction in the medical damage award. However, I dissent from the majority's reduction of Rachel's general damage award and its reapportionment of fault. The jury's general damage award to Rachel and the trial judge's apportionment of fault were clearly supported by the record and not manifestly erroneous. The majority fails to properly apply the Watson factors to the facts, which show KCS's acts of negligence were clearly paramount compared to Mitchell's inadvertent negligence. The majority also fails to appreciate the particular effects of this injury on Rachel as a young girl in reducing the general damages, instead improperly relying on a vastly dissimilar case.

Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway

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