Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
1984 Tex. LEXIS 317, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213, 665 S.W.2d 414 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
In Texas, a release of liability discharges only those tortfeasors specifically identified by name or with such descriptive particularity that their identity is not in doubt. Furthermore, Texas adopts a system of pure comparative causation for strict products liability actions, where a defendant's liability is reduced by the percentage of causation attributed to the plaintiff and any settling tortfeasors.
Facts:
- Benjamin Smithson was an instructor pilot for Air Plains West, Inc., which owned a Cessna 150 airplane.
- In 1976, while Smithson was giving flying lessons to James Parker, the Cessna 150 crashed in New Mexico, killing both men.
- Parker’s widow, Carolyn Duncan, alleged that design and manufacturing defects in the cockpit seats caused the seats' legs to break during the crash, leading to the deaths.
- Duncan first filed suit against Air Plains West and Smithson's estate, alleging negligence.
- Duncan settled that initial lawsuit with Air Plains West for $90,000.
- As part of the settlement, Duncan signed a release document that discharged Air Plains West, Smithson's estate, and 'any other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible therefor, whether named herein or not' from all claims related to the crash.
Procedural Posture:
- Carolyn Duncan first sued Air Plains West, Inc. and the estate of Benjamin Smithson in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
- That federal lawsuit was terminated when Duncan settled with Air Plains West for $90,000 and executed a release.
- Duncan subsequently instituted a wrongful death action against Cessna Aircraft Company in Texas state trial court, alleging product defects.
- Cessna filed a counterclaim against Smithson's estate for contribution, which the trial court struck.
- The jury returned a verdict of $1,000,000 for Duncan.
- The trial court granted Cessna's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (JNOV), finding that the release Duncan signed had also discharged Cessna's liability.
- Duncan appealed to the court of appeals, which served as the intermediate appellate court.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a partial new trial.
- Cessna, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
1. Under Texas law, does a release that discharges a named party and 'any other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible' also discharge a tortfeasor who is not specifically named in the document? 2. In a strict products liability action, may a defendant seek contribution from a negligent third party by having the trier of fact apportion responsibility among the parties based on their comparative causation of the plaintiff's injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - Spears, Justice
1. No. Under Texas law, a release discharges only those tortfeasors who are named or otherwise specifically identified. A general, categorical reference to 'any other corporations or persons' does not meet the requirement of descriptive particularity necessary to identify and discharge an unnamed party like Cessna. The court adopted the most significant relationship test for choice-of-law issues, determining that Texas law applied because Texas had the most significant interest in protecting its resident (Duncan) and its policies regarding settlements, whereas New Mexico had no interest in the dispute between a Texas plaintiff and a Kansas defendant. 2. Yes. In products liability cases, Texas hereby adopts a system of pure comparative causation to apportion damages among all responsible parties. The court overruled prior precedent to fashion a common law system where the trier of fact will determine the percentage of the plaintiff's injuries caused by the defective product, the plaintiff's own conduct (subsuming assumption of risk and misuse), and any third parties. This system allows for a more equitable and efficient allocation of loss, replacing the confusing and unfair 'all-or-nothing' defenses previously used. A plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by their percentage of causation, and a non-settling defendant’s liability will be reduced by the percentage of causation attributed to any settling tortfeasors.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Pope, Chief Justice
This opinion concurs with the majority's adoption of a comparative causation system for products liability cases but dissents from the refusal to remand the case for a new trial. The dissent argues that it is fundamentally unfair to deny Cessna the benefit of the very rule it successfully advocated for. The trial court repeatedly struck Cessna's pleadings and excluded evidence related to the pilot's negligence based on the old law. For the majority to now adopt the new rule but penalize Cessna for failing to perfect a bill of exceptions on an issue the trial court had foreclosed is unjust. The case should be remanded to be retried under the new, fairer standard established by the majority's opinion.
Analysis:
This is a landmark Texas Supreme Court decision that fundamentally reshaped the state's tort law. Its adoption of pure comparative causation moved Texas from a harsh, all-or-nothing system to a modern, equitable framework for allocating liability in complex products liability cases. This change simplifies trial submissions by subsuming defenses like assumption of risk and misuse into a single inquiry of comparative causation. The decision also solidified the rule on releases, requiring precision and intent, which protects plaintiffs from inadvertently giving up claims against unknown tortfeasors and provides clarity in settlement negotiations.
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