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Duffy v. Brooker

District Court of Appeal of Florida
614 So. 2d 546, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 4757, 1993 WL 64489 (1993)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An award of attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 766.206(3) is a limited sanction for a non-compliant presuit response in a medical malpractice case and is not an award to a "prevailing party," and therefore does not entitle the recipient to appellate attorney's fees under § 59.46.


Facts:

  • A claimant initiated a medical malpractice claim.
  • The defendant, the defendant's insurer, or the defendant's attorney mailed a response rejecting the claim.
  • This response was subsequently found to be non-compliant with the statutory reasonable investigation requirements for medical malpractice cases.

Procedural Posture:

  • A claimant brought a medical malpractice action in a trial court.
  • The trial court found that the defendant's presuit response rejecting the claim violated the reasonable investigation requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes.
  • Pursuant to § 766.206(3), the trial court awarded the claimant attorney's fees and costs incurred during the presuit investigation and evaluation phase.
  • The case was appealed to this intermediate appellate court.
  • The appellee (claimant) filed a motion in the appellate court seeking an award of attorney's fees for the appeal, citing sections 766.206(3) and 59.46.
  • The appellate court denied the appellee's motion.
  • The appellee then filed the current motion for review, asking the court to reconsider its denial of appellate attorney's fees.

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Issue:

Does an award of attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 766.206(3), as a sanction for a defendant's non-compliant presuit response to a medical malpractice claim, automatically entitle the claimant to appellate attorney's fees under the "prevailing party" provision of § 59.46?


Opinions:

Majority - Barfield, J.

No. An award of attorney's fees under § 766.206(3) does not automatically entitle a party to appellate fees because it is a limited sanction, not a prevailing party award. The court reasoned that § 766.206(3) is narrowly tailored to punish a specific presuit failure—mailing a non-compliant response—by making the sender personally liable only for fees and costs incurred during the 'investigation and evaluation of the claim.' In contrast, § 59.46 allows for appellate fees only when a statute provides for fees 'to the prevailing party.' Because § 766.206(3) imposes a specific, limited sanction and does not designate the recipient as a 'prevailing party' in the overall litigation, § 59.46 is inapplicable.



Analysis:

This decision clarifies the distinction between fee awards as sanctions for specific procedural violations and fee awards based on prevailing party status. It prevents the expansion of a narrow statutory sanction, intended to police presuit conduct in malpractice cases, into a general fee-shifting provision for appellate litigation. The ruling establishes that entitlement to appellate fees requires a specific statutory or contractual basis tied to the overall outcome of the case, not merely success on a preliminary procedural issue. This holding reinforces the principle that different fee-shifting statutes serve distinct purposes and cannot be combined unless their plain language allows for it.

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