Yes. The company had a legal duty to be careful. The court said that because OAR was put in charge of a dangerous inmate's physical custody, they had a 'special relationship' that made them responsible for controlling him. This isn't like a parole officer who just checks in on someone; OAR was acting like a private jailer. The court also said that this duty to protect people wasn't just for a specific person Spencer might have threatened. The duty was to everyone in the 'zone of danger'—the area he could reach because of the halfway house's carelessness. Since Ms. Davis lived nearby, she was in that zone, so OAR had a duty to protect her.

Yes, OAR needed to be more careful with Spencer. They were in charge of him and knew he could be dangerous. Unlike people who just check on someone who's out of prison, OAR was supposed to watch Spencer very closely. They should have known that if they weren't careful, Spencer might hurt someone nearby. Even though they didn't know exactly who he might hurt, they still had a responsibility to be careful. The court decided that OAR might be responsible for what happened and that the case should continue to see if OAR did something wrong.

Yes. A private operator of a facility like a halfway house has a duty to exercise reasonable care to control a dangerous inmate when it takes charge of that inmate. This case is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, which applies when one 'takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled.' Unlike parole officers who merely supervise parolees in the community (as in Fox v. Custis), OAR assumed physical custody of Spencer, an inmate still serving his penitentiary sentence, thereby 'taking charge' of him. Furthermore, unlike the public officials in Marshall v. Winston, OAR is a private entity and is not protected by the rule requiring a duty to a 'specific identifiable person.' The duty owed by OAR extends to a class of foreseeable victims, which includes those within the 'area of danger' that Spencer could access due to OAR's negligent failure to control him. Debbie Dudley Davis, living a short distance from the facility, was a member of this class.

Yes, because OAR took charge of Spencer, they had a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 to exercise reasonable care to control him to prevent harm. We reverse the trial court's decision for several reasons. First, unlike the parolee in Fox v. Custis, Spencer was still actively serving his sentence and in the custody of the Department of Corrections when received by OAR. Second, OAR's contract with the Department imposed a much higher level of supervision than that required of parole officers. These factors make OAR '[o]ne who takes charge' of Spencer within the meaning of Restatement § 319. Furthermore, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to infer that OAR knew or should have known Spencer was likely to cause bodily harm if not controlled. Unlike in Marshall v. Winston, OAR is not a public official, so the 'special duty' doctrine does not apply. The duty imposed by § 319 extends to a class of potential victims foreseeably at risk, which in this case includes Davis as a member of the class of persons within the 'area of danger' accessible to Spencer during his unauthorized absence. Therefore, we hold that OAR owed a duty to Davis, and the case should proceed to determine if OAR breached that duty.

Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, Inc.

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