Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc
443 Mich. 68, 503 N.W.2d 645 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for filing a criminal complaint against a fellow employee when the alleged crime arose out of a work incident and occurred at the workplace, and the WPA preempts any common-law public policy claim arising from the same facts.
Facts:
- Michael L. Dudewicz worked as a parts manager for Norris Schmid, Inc., an automobile dealership.
- On November 4, 1987, Dudewicz, with dealership owner Samuel Norris, sought assistance from service manager Dick Boehm to obtain warranty service for an important wholesale customer.
- After Norris left the service area, Boehm allegedly assaulted Dudewicz, grabbing him by the collar, attempting to pull him across the counter, tearing buttons off his shirt, breaking a gold chain, and leaving fingerprints on his neck.
- The same day, Dudewicz reported the incident to Norris Schmid’s new car sales manager and filed criminal charges with the Midland County Prosecutor against Boehm for assault and battery.
- On December 1, 1987, Norris called Dudewicz to his office and told him to drop the criminal charges against Boehm or be fired, and to leave the dealership premises.
- Dudewicz left, believing he was fired but could regain his job if he dropped the charges.
- On December 3, 1987, Dudewicz returned to the dealership, but Norris told him the dealership considered him to have quit and called the police to escort him from the premises when he refused to leave without a termination letter.
- Dudewicz asserted that he had not quit, but had, in fact, been fired.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael L. Dudewicz filed a two-count complaint against Norris Schmid, Inc. in trial court, alleging violations of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and public policy.
- The trial court granted Norris Schmid, Inc.'s motion for summary disposition on the public policy claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
- After hearing proofs on the remaining count, the trial court granted Norris Schmid, Inc.'s motion for a directed verdict on the WPA claim under MCR 2.515.
- The trial court denied Dudewicz’s motion to reconsider this verdict.
- Dudewicz appealed the trial court's decisions to the Michigan Court of Appeals (appellant Dudewicz, appellee Norris Schmid, Inc.).
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grants of summary disposition and directed verdict, finding for Dudewicz on both the public policy and WPA claims (192 Mich App 247; 480 NW2d 612 (1991)).
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Issue:
1. Does the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who files a criminal complaint against a fellow employee for an assault that arose out of a dispute over the handling of the employer’s business, during business hours, and at the site of employment? 2. Does the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine apply when the Whistleblowers' Protection Act provides a specific statutory remedy for the same retaliatory discharge?
Opinions:
Majority - Brickley, J.
1. Yes, the Whistleblowers' Protection Act prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for reporting a fellow employee's work-related assault to a public body. 2. No, the public policy exception to employment at will does not apply because the WPA provides the exclusive statutory remedy for such retaliatory discharge. The court found that the plain language of the WPA (MCL 15.362) does not limit protection to employee reports of violations by employers, but broadly applies to reports of "a violation or a suspected violation of a law." This interpretation is supported by the legislative analysis, which acknowledged that employees are reluctant to inform on "an employer or a colleague." Remedial statutes like the WPA are to be liberally construed in favor of the benefited persons. The court distinguished a prior Court of Appeals decision, Dickson v. Oakland Univ., noting that its restrictive dicta was erroneous and that its facts were distinguishable because the report was made only to the employer, not a public body. The court emphasized that the alleged crime, an assault by a fellow employee arising from a work dispute at the work site, was very much within the employer-employee setting, aligning with the WPA's intent to combat corruption or criminally irresponsible behavior in business. Regarding the public policy claim, the court held that remedies provided by statute for rights without a common-law counterpart are exclusive, not cumulative, citing Pompey v. General Motors Corp. and Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. Since no common-law right existed to be free from being fired for reporting a violation of law, the WPA's specific prohibition against retaliatory discharge for such conduct acts as the exclusive remedy. Where statutes specifically proscribe retaliatory discharges, common-law public policy claims are consistently denied. Therefore, because the WPA provides relief to Dudewicz for reporting illegal activity, his public policy claim is not sustainable.
Dissenting - Boyle, J.
1. No, the Whistleblowers' Protection Act does not prohibit discharge under these facts because the plaintiff was not engaged in protected activity as defined by the act. 2. Yes, the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that the WPA's protection is not solely limited to employer violations, acknowledging that an "agent of an employer" could be a co-worker and legislative analysis supported protecting reports against colleagues. However, the dissent argued that the WPA applies to activity involving a report of an employer's or co-worker's "corrupt or criminally irresponsible behavior in the conduct of government or large businesses," specifically targeting illegal business practices or violations that result from the conduct of business. In this case, the co-worker's criminal act (assault) did not involve corrupt or illegal business practices of the employer or co-worker, nor did it result from the conduct of the employer's business; therefore, it was not within the umbrella of activity protected under the WPA. Despite the WPA's inapplicability, the dissent argued that the plaintiff's activity was protected as a matter of fundamental public policy. Under the employment at will doctrine, grounds for discharge that are "so contrary to public policy" may be actionable. Public policy strongly favors encouraging citizens to cooperate in the prosecution of crime, as evidenced by the Penal Code making assault a crime and provisions encouraging crime victims to report. Citing cases like Pratt v. Brown Machine Co. and Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., the dissent contended that conditioning employment on an employee's agreement to conceal or stifle a crime investigation violates public policy. Forcing an employee to choose between justice and livelihood is against the state's public policy.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the scope of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), expanding its coverage to include reports of violations by fellow employees, not just employers, provided the incident is work-related. It also firmly established that when a specific statutory remedy for retaliatory discharge, like the WPA, covers the complained-of conduct, it preempts common-law public policy claims, thereby limiting the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. This decision ensures employees have a clear statutory avenue for redress in certain whistleblower scenarios while preventing the proliferation of duplicative common-law claims.
