DuBOIS v. QUILITZSCH
21 A.3d 375, 2011 WL 2517021 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under Rhode Island law, for dog bite injuries occurring within the owner's enclosure, strict liability does not apply; instead, the common law 'one-bite rule' requires a plaintiff to prove the owner knew of the dog's vicious propensities before the incident.
Facts:
- Frederick Quilitzsch, Jr. lived in a house in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which he owned with his father, Frederick Quilitzsch, Sr.
- Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr. maintained a pigeon loft on the property, and Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr. owned an Australian Shepherd named Bear.
- Bear, a three-year-old, 47-pound dog, was regularly kept tethered outside next to the pigeon loft by a 20-25 foot cable.
- In September 2007, Barry E. DuBois, an environmental officer, arrived at the property to inspect the pigeon loft without prior notice, as Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr. had applied to renew his license.
- Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr. was not home, and Bear was tethered in its usual location next to the pigeon loft.
- After knocking on the house door with no answer, Mr. DuBois walked to the pigeon loft, and as he bent down to look inside, Bear attacked him, knocking him over and biting his left hand and right calf.
- Upon arriving, Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr. told Mr. DuBois that Bear was tied there because Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr. was expecting a refrigerator delivery that day, though Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr. later stated he was expecting a 'leaf picker upper' and the dog was outside because it was a nice day.
- Neither Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr., Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr., nor Mr. DuBois were aware of any prior incidents where Bear had attacked someone, and Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr. reported Bear had never bitten anyone and allowed guests to pet it.
Procedural Posture:
- Barry E. DuBois and his wife, Susan L. DuBois, filed a civil action in the Rhode Island Superior Court (trial court) against Frederick Quilitzsch, Sr. and Frederick Quilitzsch, Jr., alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence.
- The defendants answered the complaint and the parties conducted discovery.
- In July 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the attack occurred within the home's enclosure and they had no knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensity.
- A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held in Superior Court on September 15, 2009.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts, finding the fence provided reasonable notice of privacy for the strict liability claim and no evidence of the defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities for the common law claims.
- Final judgment in favor of defendants was entered by the Superior Court on September 23, 2009.
- The plaintiffs (Barry E. DuBois and Susan L. DuBois) timely appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for the dog owners on common law negligence and premises liability claims, where the plaintiffs alleged the owners had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities despite no evidence of prior attacks, based on an equivocal statement about tethering the dog for an expected delivery?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Suttell
No, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities. Rhode Island law applies strict liability for dog bites only when the dog is outside an owner's enclosure; for incidents within an enclosure, the common law 'one-bite rule' requires proof that the owner knew the dog had dangerous tendencies. The court emphasized that no evidence of prior attacks existed. Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr.'s statement about the dog being tied due to an expected delivery was considered 'equivocal' and insufficient to demonstrate such knowledge, as people might tether dogs for reasons unrelated to viciousness. The Supreme Court declined the plaintiffs' invitation to modify the established dog bite law or expand premises liability for invitees, asserting that such policy changes are best left to the General Assembly.
Dissenting - Justice Robinson
Yes, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a material factual dispute concerning the premises liability and negligence counts that should have been resolved by a fact-finder. Justice Robinson argued that summary judgment is an 'extreme remedy' and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. The dissent highlighted the contradictory statements regarding why Bear was tethered—Mr. DuBois's recollection of Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr. saying it was due to a delivery versus Mr. Quilitzsch, Jr.'s sworn statement that it was a nice day. Justice Robinson believed a jury could have found Mr. Quilitzsch, Sr.'s statement credible and inferred that the dog's owner was aware of its dangerousness, given the dog's size and the alleged reason for isolating it from a stranger. Such conflicting testimony about a key reason for the dog's placement should have precluded summary judgment.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the long-standing 'one-bite rule' in Rhode Island for dog bite incidents occurring within an owner's enclosure, distinguishing it from the statutory strict liability for attacks outside an enclosure. It highlights the stringent standard for overcoming summary judgment, requiring concrete evidence of an owner's knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, rather than mere speculation or equivocal statements. Furthermore, the court reiterated its deference to the state legislature on matters of public policy, firmly declining to judicially expand common law liability for dog bites or alter existing premises liability standards, even for invitees.
