Dubin v. City of Philadelphia
1938 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 264, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute permitting substituted service of process on a nonresident owner, tenant, or user of real estate for civil actions arising from that property does not violate the Due Process Clause. A mortgagee who exercises control over a property by collecting rents and leasing it qualifies as a 'user' under such a statute.
Facts:
- Mabel G. Lesher, a resident of New Jersey, held a mortgage on a parcel of real estate in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
- After the mortgagor defaulted on interest and tax payments, Lesher began collecting rents from the property's tenants.
- Lesher applied the collected rent money to pay for city taxes and water rents associated with the property.
- Lesher also executed a lease with the tenants occupying the property.
- A plaintiff was injured after falling on a broken sidewalk adjacent to the property controlled by Lesher.
Procedural Posture:
- A plaintiff sued the City of Philadelphia in a Pennsylvania court of first instance for damages sustained from a fall on a broken sidewalk.
- The City of Philadelphia joined Mabel G. Lesher, a nonresident, as an additional defendant, alleging she was primarily responsible for the sidewalk's condition.
- Service of process was made on Lesher in New Jersey through substituted service on the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth, pursuant to the Act of 1937.
- Lesher made a special appearance ('de bene esse') to challenge the court's jurisdiction over her.
- Lesher filed a petition to set aside the service of the writ, arguing that the Act of 1937 was unconstitutional and, alternatively, did not apply to her as a 'mortgagee in possession'.
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Issue:
Does a Pennsylvania statute permitting substituted service on a nonresident 'user' of real estate for injuries arising from that property violate the Due Process Clause when applied to a nonresident mortgagee in possession who exercises control by collecting rents and leasing the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Bok, P. J.
No. The statute is a constitutional exercise of the state's police power, and its application to Lesher is proper because her actions qualify her as a 'user' of the property. The court extended the legal rationale supporting substituted service on nonresident motorists to nonresident property owners, reasoning that the state has a strong interest in ensuring both groups act with care to protect its citizens. Owning and controlling property within a state creates an obligation to answer for injuries arising from it in that state's courts. Lesher's acts of collecting rent, paying taxes, and leasing the property constituted an active exercise of her right to possession, going beyond a mere passive interest. This level of control and derivation of benefit from the property brings her within the statutory definition of a 'user,' making substituted service of process valid.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant early extension of long-arm jurisdiction principles from the mobile context of automobiles to the static context of real property. By analogizing the state's police power over its highways to its power over real estate, the court expanded the concept of implied consent to jurisdiction. The decision foreshadows the 'minimum contacts' doctrine later established in International Shoe, focusing on the nonresident's purposeful activities within the forum state and the obligations that arise from those activities. This ruling affirmed that deriving economic benefit and exercising control over property are sufficient to subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of the state's courts for torts connected to that property.
