Droste v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF PITKIN
159 P.3d 601, 2007 WL 1393757, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 388 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Local governments have the necessarily implied authority under the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 (LUEA) to impose temporary development moratoria, confirmed through public hearings and of reasonable duration, while preparing a comprehensive master plan, even if another statute limits moratoria for zoning plan adoption without a hearing to six months.
Facts:
- In March 1974, Pitkin County zoned the Droste Ranch, a 925-acre property owned by the Drostes, as AF-1, allowing single-family dwellings on lots of ten acres or more.
- In 1975, Pitkin County designated the Droste Ranch as an area with significant impact on natural resources of statewide importance.
- In 1996 and 1999, Pitkin County purchased conservation easements covering approximately 600 acres of the Droste Ranch to preserve critical wildlife habitats, particularly elk migration corridors.
- In 2000 and 2002, the Drostes applied for approval of three separate development projects on their ranch, all of which were denied.
- In February 2003, a representative of the Drostes discussed three potential new development applications with a County representative, but the Drostes did not file any applications at that time.
- The General Assembly mandated that Pitkin County adopt a master plan for its unincorporated area by January 8, 2004.
- On April 9, 2003, Pitkin County’s Board of County Commissioners adopted Ordinance Number 183-2003 (confirmed through a public hearing), imposing a temporary moratorium effective March 12, 2003, which prevented county departments from processing land use applications in specific planning areas, with an anticipated length of sixty days, to allow time for a comprehensive study as part of the master plan adoption process.
- On May 14, 2003, the County Commissioners enacted a second ordinance (confirmed through a public hearing) continuing the moratorium through completion of the master planning process, which was anticipated by January 1, 2004, resulting in a total moratorium duration of approximately ten months.
Procedural Posture:
- On May 14, 2003, the Drostes filed suit against the Pitkin County Board of County Commissioners in the District Court for Pitkin County (the trial court), seeking a declaratory judgment that the County lacked authority to impose the moratorium and praying for injunctive relief.
- The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court initially granted summary judgment to Pitkin County, finding authority under the Areas and Activities of State Interest Act (H.B. 1041) and the County's general police power.
- The Drostes filed a motion for the trial court to amend its judgment, arguing that H.B. 1041 did not apply to lands zoned prior to May 17, 1974, such as the Droste Ranch.
- The trial court amended its judgment, adding that the County had authority to impose the moratorium for master plan preparation under its general police power and the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 (LUEA), as well as H.B. 1041.
- The Drostes appealed the trial court's decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court), with the Drostes as appellants.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that Pitkin County, as the appellee, had authority to impose the moratorium pursuant to the LUEA, without addressing H.B. 1041 or general police powers.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion.
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Issue:
Does the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 grant counties the implied authority to impose temporary development moratoria, confirmed through public hearings, of a reasonable duration exceeding six months, for the purpose of preparing a master plan, notwithstanding a more specific statute that limits moratoria imposed without a public hearing for zoning plan adoption to six months?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hobbs
Yes, Pitkin County had authority under sections 29-20-101 to -107 to adopt ordinances, confirmed through public hearings, imposing a temporary moratorium on land use application reviews that lasted approximately ten months while it prepared its master plan. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, stating that counties possess powers expressly granted by the Colorado Constitution or General Assembly, including implied powers reasonably necessary to exercise delegated powers. The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974 (LUEA) provides broad authority for local governments to plan for and regulate land use, including protecting significant wildlife habitats and regulating based on community impact. The General Assembly specifically mandated Pitkin County to adopt a master plan by a certain date and to conduct comprehensive surveys and studies for it. Moratoria are recognized as an "essential tool of successful development" that preserves the status quo during the development of long-term plans. The court harmonized the LUEA with section 30-28-121 of the County Planning and Building Codes, which limits moratoria without public hearings for zoning plan adoption to six months. It reasoned that section 30-28-121 is a specific, additional grant of authority for a particular, limited circumstance (zoning moratoria without a hearing), and does not conflict with, preempt, or control the broader, necessarily implied authority under the LUEA to impose a reasonable moratorium with public hearings for the comprehensive purpose of master plan preparation. Pitkin County's moratorium was adopted through public hearings and was directly tied to the mandated master plan process, specifically addressing environmental and wildlife concerns explicitly covered by the LUEA, and thus was a permissible exercise of implied authority.
Dissenting - Justice Eid
No, the majority's approval of a moratorium of potentially limitless duration, even if it happened to last ten months in this case, exceeds the scope of authority granted to local governments by the General Assembly, which specifically limits moratoria to six months. Justice Eid argued that local governments have only expressly granted powers. While the Land Use Enabling Act provides "broad authority," this authority is not unlimited. Section 29-20-107 of the LUEA states that "where other procedural or substantive requirements for the planning for or regulation of the use of land are provided by law, such requirements shall control." Justice Eid contended that the six-month time limitation on moratoria in section 30-28-121 is such a specific requirement that should control. He dismissed the majority's distinction regarding public hearings, noting that the moratorium was imposed before the first hearing and that the six-month limitation is a statutory requirement irrespective of a hearing. He emphasized that section 30-28-121 is a very specific provision regarding moratoria, whereas the LUEA is general and does not mention moratoria. Since both provisions were enacted in the same legislation (1974), the more specific provision should control. Justice Eid also found the majority’s distinction between "master planning" and "zoning" unconvincing, as the County's own ordinance stated the moratorium's purpose was to establish "appropriate zoning and development regulations" resulting from the Master Plan process. He concluded that recognizing a "necessarily implied authority" for potentially limitless moratoria effectively grants local governments a general zoning police power inconsistent with the express six-month limitation and that such authority should be granted by the General Assembly, not judicially created.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the implied powers of Colorado local governments under the Land Use Enabling Act of 1974, allowing them greater flexibility to manage growth and environmental protection through temporary development moratoria. By harmonizing a specific six-month limit for "no-hearing" zoning moratoria with the broader "with-hearing" master plan moratoria, the court avoids a strict interpretation that would unduly restrict a recognized "essential tool" for planning. The decision affirms that comprehensive planning, especially concerning sensitive environmental areas, can justify temporary development freezes, potentially impacting property owners by delaying or altering development expectations during such planning periods. It also highlights the court's willingness to infer necessary powers from general statutory grants when essential for achieving legislative intent, particularly in dynamic areas like land use.
