Draper v. United States
1896 U.S. LEXIS 1853, 17 S. Ct. 107, 164 U.S. 240 (1896)
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Rule of Law:
When a state is admitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with other states, it acquires criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on Indian reservations within its boundaries by non-Indians against non-Indians, unless Congress has expressly reserved that jurisdiction to the federal government in the state's enabling act.
Facts:
- Draper, a non-Indian, was accused of committing murder.
- The victim of the alleged murder was also a non-Indian.
- The crime occurred on the Crow Indian Reservation.
- The Crow Indian Reservation is located entirely within the geographical boundaries of the State of Montana.
Procedural Posture:
- Draper was indicted for murder in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana, a federal trial court.
- He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by the federal court.
- After the verdict, Draper filed a motion in arrest of judgment, arguing the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the crime.
- The Circuit Court denied Draper's motion.
- Draper appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error.
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Issue:
Does a United States Circuit Court have criminal jurisdiction over a murder committed by a non-Indian against another non-Indian on an Indian reservation located within a state, when that state's enabling act provides that Indian lands 'shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States'?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No. The United States Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction. Upon admission to the Union on an equal footing with the original states, a state acquires criminal jurisdiction over its entire territory, including Indian reservations, for crimes committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians, unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. The court's reasoning follows the precedent set in United States v. McBratney, which established that state jurisdiction is the default rule. The language in Montana's enabling act stating that Indian lands 'shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States' does not create an exception to this rule. This provision is not a reservation of general criminal jurisdiction but rather refers to the federal government's authority over land titles, allotment policies, and the disposition of tribal property, ensuring federal Indian policy is not frustrated by the state. To interpret this language as stripping the state of its inherent criminal jurisdiction would violate the principle of 'equality of statehood,' which requires any such exception to be made with express words.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the 'equal footing doctrine' and solidifies the precedent from United States v. McBratney. It establishes a strong presumption in favor of state criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians on Indian reservations. The case clarifies that general disclaimer language in state enabling acts regarding federal control over Indian lands is typically insufficient to divest a state of this jurisdiction. For federal jurisdiction to be exclusive, Congress must use clear and express language to that effect, thereby setting a high bar for creating federal criminal enclaves within state borders.
