Draghetti v. Chmielewski
626 N.E.2d 862, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1456, 416 Mass. 808 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A person can be held liable for defamation even if their statements are paraphrased rather than directly quoted. Furthermore, a public official's conditional privilege to make defamatory statements concerning a subordinate's fitness for duty does not extend to communications with a newspaper of general circulation.
Facts:
- Steven G. Draghetti was a police officer for the town of Agawam and also worked as a part-time instructor at the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Center (the academy).
- On March 17, 1987, Draghetti injured his back on duty and was placed on the injured roster, which forbids working.
- While on the injured roster, Draghetti attended a class at the academy without pay to assist an inexperienced substitute teacher.
- An internal police investigation into the incident, ordered by Captain Richard Light, concluded there was no evidence of a conflict of interest.
- On March 31, 1987, Agawam Police Chief Stanley J. Chmielewski wrote to the academy's director, falsely stating Draghetti had a scheduling problem and recommending he be replaced as an instructor.
- Shortly thereafter, the academy terminated Draghetti's employment as an instructor.
- In 1989, during a broader district attorney investigation, Chmielewski spoke to a local newspaper reporter.
- The newspaper subsequently published articles paraphrasing Chmielewski's statements, which implied that the police department found evidence Draghetti intended to commit a crime (collecting pay from both jobs simultaneously) and had referred the matter for criminal investigation.
Procedural Posture:
- Steven G. Draghetti sued Stanley J. Chmielewski in Superior Court, alleging unlawful interference with contractual and business relations, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The trial judge granted a directed verdict for Chmielewski on the emotional distress claim.
- A jury returned a verdict for Draghetti on the defamation and interference claims, awarding $50,000 and $32,760 respectively.
- The trial judge denied Chmielewski's post-trial motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur of damages.
- Chmielewski, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the state's intermediate appellate court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state's highest court, transferred the appeal to itself on its own motion.
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Issue:
Does a police chief's conditional privilege to comment on a subordinate's fitness for duty extend to defamatory statements made to a newspaper of general circulation?
Opinions:
Majority - Abrams, J.
No. A police chief's conditional privilege does not extend to defamatory statements published to a newspaper of general circulation. The court reasoned that an individual is not immune from defamation liability simply because their statements were not direct quotations; if the paraphrased statements are susceptible of a defamatory meaning, a claim may proceed. Here, Chmielewski's statements to the press could be reasonably understood to mean there was evidence Draghetti intended to commit a crime, which is defamatory per se. The court rejected Chmielewski's claim of a conditional privilege, holding that such a privilege is limited to communications published to a narrow group sharing a legitimate interest, such as officials involved in an investigation, not to the public at large via the press. The court affirmed that a police chief has no official duty to report internal investigations to the press, and extending the 'common interest' privilege to the media would effectively privilege all newsworthy statements. The court also affirmed the interference verdict, finding that Chmielewski used improper means (a knowingly false statement in the letter) to have Draghetti fired, which is actionable even if he could have achieved the same result through proper means.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the boundaries of conditional privilege for public officials in defamation law. It establishes that the privilege, designed to protect necessary official communications, does not provide a shield for statements made to the general public through the media. This holding limits the ability of employers, particularly in the public sector, to publicly disparage employees under the guise of official duty. The case also reinforces the tort of intentional interference by confirming that using improper means, such as fraudulent misrepresentation, is independently wrongful, regardless of whether a legitimate path to the same outcome existed.
