Downing v. United Auto Racing Ass'n
570 N.E.2d 828, 211 Ill. App. 3d 877, 156 Ill. Dec. 352 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under a comparative fault system, a plaintiff's ordinary negligence can be compared to a defendant's willful and wanton misconduct to proportionally reduce the plaintiff's compensatory damage award.
Facts:
- Terry Downing, a member of a pit crew, was at a midget car race held on premises operated by United Auto Racing Association (UARA) and Aaron Willis.
- Downing observed a race car driven by Robert Guess 'bicycling' (inner wheels lifting off the track) in the turns, which he considered a hazardous condition.
- At the time, Downing was standing in a grassy area off the track between the pit and the straightaway, a location unprotected by a guardrail.
- Downing and others present were aware that it was dangerous to remain in this unprotected area during a race.
- Downing began walking along the track to find an official to 'blackflag' Guess's car and have it removed from the race.
- As Downing walked away, Guess's car again bicycled in a turn, flipped over, and slid into the unprotected area where Downing was.
- The car struck Downing, pinning him against a fence and causing severe injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Terry Downing sued United Auto Racing Association (UARA) and Aaron Willis in the circuit court of Cook County, a state trial court.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- The jury found defendants UARA and Willis liable for willful and wanton misconduct and awarded plaintiff $1.5 million in compensatory damages.
- The jury also found that plaintiff Downing was 59% comparatively negligent and reduced the damage award to a net amount of $615,000.
- The trial court entered judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict.
- Defendants UARA and Willis (as appellants) appealed the judgment to the intermediate appellate court, and plaintiff Downing (as cross-appellant) cross-appealed the reduction of his damages.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's ordinary negligence reduce the amount of compensatory damages recoverable for a defendant's willful and wanton misconduct under a comparative fault system?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McMorrow
Yes, a plaintiff’s ordinary negligence can be considered to offset the compensatory damages awarded for a defendant's willful and wanton misconduct. The underlying principle of comparative fault is to equitably apportion damages among parties according to their respective fault in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Given the hybrid nature of willful and wanton conduct, which can range from slightly more than ordinary negligence to just short of an intentional tort, allowing a fact-finder to prorate damages best serves justice. Although there is a distinction in the degree of culpability between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton conduct, this difference does not preclude an equitable apportionment of compensatory damages. This approach is consistent with the reasons for adopting comparative negligence and is not undermined by exceptions made for cases involving the Structural Work Act or strict product liability, which have different policy justifications.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle in Illinois tort law that comparative fault applies even when there is a disparity in the nature of the parties' conduct. It rejects the older, all-or-nothing approach where a defendant's willful and wanton conduct would negate any consideration of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. By allowing a jury to apportion damages, the ruling fully embraces the equitable goals of comparative fault, ensuring that a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by their own degree of carelessness, thereby preventing them from being compensated for harm they partially caused. This holding provides clarity on a contested issue and influences how damages are calculated in cases involving heightened, but not intentional, defendant culpability.
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