Dowling v. United States
87 L. Ed. 2d 152, 105 S. Ct. 3127 (1985)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The National Stolen Property Act's prohibition on the interstate transportation of goods 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' does not apply to goods that merely embody infringed intellectual property, such as copyrights, because the statute requires a physical taking of the goods themselves.
Facts:
- Around 1976, Paul Edmond Dowling and a partner began manufacturing and distributing bootleg phonorecords containing unauthorized recordings of unreleased Elvis Presley performances.
- The source material for these records came from studio outtakes, acetates, and tapes from motion pictures, concerts, and television appearances.
- Dowling and his partner never obtained authorization from, nor paid royalties to, the owners of the copyrights for the musical compositions they reproduced.
- Initially, Dowling handled the artistic production in Maryland, while his partner managed business operations in California.
- In early 1979, the partner began shipping large quantities of the bootleg albums via commercial truck from California to Dowling in Maryland.
- Dowling filled customer orders obtained through a mail-order catalog business, mailing several hundred packages per week from Maryland.
- The criminal charges under § 2314 arose from eight specific large-volume shipments of these bootleg phonorecords from Los Angeles to either Baltimore or Miami.
- The value of each of these shipments, based on the copyrighted material they contained, exceeded the statutory minimum of $5,000.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Edmond Dowling was charged by indictment in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
- Following a bench trial, the district court convicted Dowling on eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, among other offenses.
- Dowling, as appellant, appealed the convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the unauthorized bootleg records constituted 'stolen goods' under § 2314.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Dowling's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the interstate transportation of bootleg phonorecords, which were manufactured and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of the musical compositions performed on them, constitute the transportation of goods 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
No. The interstate transportation of bootleg phonorecords that infringe on a copyright does not constitute transportation of goods 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' under the National Stolen Property Act. The statute's language and history indicate that it contemplates a physical taking of the goods themselves, not the misappropriation of intangible rights like a copyright. The Court reasoned that copyright infringement is a distinct legal concept from theft, as an infringer does not assume physical control over the copyright or wholly deprive the owner of its use. Furthermore, § 2314 was enacted to fill jurisdictional gaps in state law enforcement for tangible stolen property crossing state lines, a problem that does not exist for copyright, which is an area of exclusive federal power. Finally, Congress has created a detailed and carefully calibrated statutory scheme to punish copyright infringement, and applying § 2314 as a 'blunderbuss' solution would be inconsistent with that specific legislative approach and could improperly extend to other areas like patent law.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
Yes. The language of § 2314 is broad enough to cover the interstate transportation of goods containing unauthorized use of copyrighted material. The dissent argued that the statute makes no distinction between tangible and intangible property. Precedent gives the terms 'stolen' and 'converted' a broad scope that includes any felonious taking intended to deprive an owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, which accurately describes Dowling's unauthorized duplication and commercial exploitation of copyrighted performances. The existence of specific copyright penalties is irrelevant, as the government may choose between overlapping criminal statutes. Lastly, a subsequent amendment to the copyright act stated its new penalties were 'in addition to... any other law,' which the dissent interpreted as implicit congressional approval of applying § 2314 to such conduct.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between the infringement of intellectual property rights and the physical theft of property under federal criminal law. It reinforces the rule of lenity, requiring that ambiguity in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of the defendant and that Congress must speak clearly to criminalize conduct. The ruling prevents the government from using broad theft statutes to prosecute intellectual property crimes, forcing prosecutors to rely on the specific, and often more nuanced, statutory schemes Congress has created for copyright and patent law. This prevents a broad interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act from encroaching on areas of law that Congress has deliberately chosen not to address with felony sanctions.
Unlock the full brief for Dowling v. United States