Dowdell v. City of Apopka

Majority - Vance, Circuit Judge

Yes, a systematic and ongoing disparity in municipal services provided to a racially identifiable community, considered with historical context and administrative decision-making patterns, does demonstrate discriminatory intent sufficient to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses (such as travel, telephone, and postage) are recoverable as 'costs' under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with the exception of routine office overhead. The court affirmed the district court's finding of discriminatory intent, stating it was not 'clearly erroneous' based on substantial evidence including video tapes, photographs, charts, and expert testimony detailing significant disparities in street paving, water distribution, and storm drainage. The court clarified that discriminatory intent is not synonymous with a racially discriminatory motive or requiring it to be the sole purpose; rather, it is the cumulative evidence of action and inaction that objectively manifests intent. The finding was supported by the 'totality of the relevant facts' which included (1) the magnitude of the disparity, 'explicable only on racial grounds,' (2) the legislative and administrative pattern of decision-making, extending for nearly half a century and indicating a deliberate deprivation (e.g., the 1968 ordinance, under-representation of blacks in official positions, ignoring black community requests while developing white areas), and (3) the foreseeable outcome of spending nearly all revenue sharing monies on the white community. The court also affirmed the district court's impoundment of federal revenue sharing funds as a valid equitable remedy for constitutional violations and as conforming with 31 U.S.C. § 1242 and § 1244(b). Regarding attorneys' fees, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's award. It rejected arguments to dissect fee applications into 'winning' and 'losing' hours, citing Jones v. Diamond that claims in complex civil rights litigation are often 'intertwined.' It also found no error in awarding fees for partially duplicative work or for hours invested prior to the formal selection of named plaintiffs in a class action, considering conferences with the NAACP as part of establishing the lawyer-client relationship for the class. On the cross-appeal, the court reversed and remanded the district court’s refusal to tax travel, telephone, and postage expenses as costs. The court held that the district court erred by applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) instead of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Under § 1988, 'reasonable attorney’s fees' must include reasonable expenses because 'attorneys’ fees and expenses are inseparably intertwined as equally vital components of the costs of litigation.' The purpose of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is to ensure effective enforcement of civil rights laws by making litigation financially feasible and encouraging 'private attorneys general.' The court established that, with the exception of routine office overhead, all reasonable expenses incurred in case preparation, during litigation, or for settlement may be taxed as costs under § 1988, with a liberal interpretation of 'reasonableness.' The case was remanded for a factual determination of the reasonableness of the requested expenses.