Dowdell v. Bloomquist
847 A.2d 827, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 48, 2004 WL 484886 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A row of trees can be considered a 'structure in the nature of a fence' under a spite fence statute. When such a statute deems a violation a 'private nuisance,' courts may grant injunctive relief to abate the nuisance even if the statutory text only explicitly provides for an action to recover monetary damages.
Facts:
- Cheryl Dowdell and Peter Bloomquist owned adjoining residential properties in Charlestown.
- Dowdell's home was situated at a higher elevation and had a distant ocean view over Bloomquist's property.
- In the fall of 2000, Bloomquist sought a zoning variance for a second-story addition to his home, which Dowdell opposed, fearing it would obstruct her view.
- This led to a contentious six-month dispute between the neighbors before the local zoning board.
- Immediately following the conclusion of the zoning board hearings in May 2001, Bloomquist planted a row of four western arborvitae trees along the property line.
- These trees, capable of growing to seventy feet, were planted directly behind an existing row of smaller arborvitae and obstructed the light and view from Dowdell's windows.
Procedural Posture:
- Cheryl Dowdell filed a complaint against Peter Bloomquist in the Rhode Island Superior Court, seeking legal and equitable relief for an alleged violation of the state's spite fence statute.
- After a nonjury trial, the trial justice found that the trees constituted a spite fence and that Bloomquist acted with malicious intent.
- The trial justice granted Dowdell's request for an injunction, ordering Bloomquist to cut the four trees to a height of no more than six feet or remove them entirely.
- Peter Bloomquist (defendant-appellant) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
- Cheryl Dowdell is the plaintiff-appellee in the appeal.
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Issue:
Does Rhode Island's spite fence statute, which deems a violation a 'private nuisance' but only expressly mentions a remedy of monetary damages, permit a court to grant injunctive relief against a row of trees found to be a spite fence?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaherty, Justice
Yes. Rhode Island's spite fence statute permits a court to grant injunctive relief. A row of trees may be considered a 'structure in the nature of a fence' under the statute. The trial court did not err in finding that the defendant's claimed purpose of privacy was a pretext for his malicious intent to annoy the plaintiff. Crucially, the statute defines a spite fence as a 'private nuisance.' Under the established law of private nuisance, equitable relief, such as an injunction, is an appropriate and available remedy to abate the nuisance. The statute's language stating an injured party 'may have an action to recover damages' is permissive and serves to sanction an additional remedy, not to exclude the traditional equitable remedies available for nuisances.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Flanders, Justice
No. While the trees constitute a spite fence, the statute does not permit injunctive relief. The statute is in derogation of the common law, which did not recognize a right to light and air, and therefore must be strictly construed. Its plain language provides only for 'an action to recover damages.' Courts should not infer remedies that the legislature did not expressly provide. The canon of statutory construction 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' (the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other) applies here; by specifying a damages remedy, the legislature implicitly excluded equitable remedies. If the General Assembly had intended to authorize injunctive relief, it would have explicitly done so, as it has in other statutes.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies Rhode Island's spite fence law by establishing two key principles. First, it broadens the definition of a 'fence' to include natural objects like a row of trees, preventing easy circumvention of the statute. Second, and more importantly, it affirms the power of courts to grant injunctive relief for statutory private nuisances even when the statute's text only explicitly mentions damages. This embraces a purposive interpretation over strict constructionism, strengthening remedies for landowners by allowing courts to order the direct abatement of a spiteful structure, which is often a more effective remedy than monetary compensation.
