Dow v. Atwood

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
1969 Me. LEXIS 223, 260 A.2d 437 (1969)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A special testamentary power of appointment fails if the intended appointee predeceases the donee, resulting in the property passing by intestacy from the donor's estate, because the appointee must be living at the effective date of the appointment and anti-lapse statutes are generally inapplicable to such powers.


Facts:

  • Harold F. Atwood created a will stating that his wife, Leonora S. Atwood, would receive all his property for life.
  • Harold's will further expressed, "it is my wish that she give, bequeath and devise the same to my brother, Alfred L. Atwood, to him and his heirs forever."
  • Harold died on October 5, 1945, survived by his wife Leonora, his brother Alfred, his sister Elizabeth, and children of a deceased brother Roger.
  • Leonora S. Atwood executed her will, which expressed her intention to appoint the property that came to her under Harold's will to Alfred L. Atwood, exercising the special testamentary power.
  • Alfred L. Atwood died intestate on August 19, 1965, survived by his wife and daughters, before Leonora.
  • Leonora S. Atwood died on September 13, 1965.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Administrator of Harold F. Atwood's Estate initiated an action for the construction of Harold's will and instructions regarding the disposition of property.
  • The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine on an agreed statement of facts.

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Issue:

Does a will creating a life estate with a special testamentary power of appointment to a named individual, where that individual predeceases the donee of the power, result in the property vesting in the named individual's heirs or passing by intestacy from the donor's estate?


Opinions:

Majority - Williamson, Chief Justice

No, it does not result in the property vesting in the named individual's heirs; rather, it passes by intestacy from the donor's estate. Harold's will created a life estate in Leonora with a special testamentary power to appoint the remainder to his brother Alfred, not a vested remainder in Alfred at Harold's death. The court reasoned that if Harold had intended Alfred to take directly, he would have stated it simply, rather than granting a power. The law is well settled that an appointee under a power must be living at the effective date of the appointment, which was Leonora's death. Since Alfred predeceased Leonora, he was not an eligible receiver. The principle that property should pass to a class of appointees on default of appointment was inapplicable because Alfred was the sole possible appointee, and with his death, the 'class' ceased to exist. The phrase 'to him and his heirs forever' in Harold's will were words of limitation, defining the estate Alfred would receive if appointed, not words of purchase creating an interest in his heirs. Furthermore, the anti-lapse statute (18 M.R.S.A. § 1008) did not benefit Alfred's heirs because it typically applies to direct devises, not special powers of appointment, and critically, Alfred was not a blood relative of Leonora (the donee of the power), which is generally a requirement for the statute to save a gift under the donee's will. Therefore, Alfred's group took nothing under Harold's will or from Leonora's power, and the property remaining at Leonora's death is to be distributed to Harold F. Atwood's intestate heirs according to the laws of descent and distribution in force at Harold's death (October 5, 1945). Leonora, as Harold's widow, retained her statutory interest in any personal property passing by intestacy.



Analysis:

This case clarifies the critical distinction between a vested remainder and a special testamentary power of appointment, emphasizing that the latter requires the appointee to be alive when the power becomes effective. It reinforces that anti-lapse statutes are narrowly construed, often applying only where the appointee is a direct blood relative of the donee of the power and where a direct gift, not a power, is involved. The ruling underscores the importance of precise drafting in wills to avoid unintended intestacy and ensures that the donor's intent regarding the specific recipient of a special power is strictly observed, even in the face of subsequent events like the appointee's death.

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