Dorsey v. United States
2012 U.S. LEXIS 4664, 567 U.S. 260, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010's lower mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses apply to offenders who committed their crimes before the Act's effective date but were sentenced after it.
Facts:
- In March 2007, Corey Hill unlawfully sold 53 grams of crack cocaine.
- In August 2008, Edward Dorsey, who had a prior felony drug conviction, unlawfully sold 5.5 grams of crack cocaine.
- Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Hill's offense carried a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence due to the quantity of crack.
- Under the 1986 Act, Dorsey's offense, combined with his prior conviction, also subjected him to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence.
- On August 3, 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which reduced the crack-to-powder sentencing disparity from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1.
- Under the new FSA, the mandatory minimum for Hill's offense was reduced to 5 years.
- Under the new FSA, Dorsey's offense was no longer subject to any mandatory minimum sentence.
- Both Hill and Dorsey were sentenced in federal court after the FSA's effective date of August 3, 2010.
Procedural Posture:
- Corey Hill and Edward Dorsey were separately indicted in federal district court for crack cocaine trafficking offenses.
- The district court, in each case, concluded that the Fair Sentencing Act's lower mandatory minimums did not apply to conduct that occurred before the Act's effective date.
- The district court sentenced both Hill and Dorsey to the 10-year mandatory minimums required under the prior 1986 Drug Act.
- Hill and Dorsey separately appealed their sentences to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts' sentences, holding that the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply to offenders who committed their crimes before its enactment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts on this issue.
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Issue:
Does the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010's reduction of the crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity apply to offenders who committed their crimes before the Act's effective date of August 3, 2010, but were sentenced after that date?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
Yes. The Fair Sentencing Act's new, more lenient mandatory minimum provisions apply to offenders who committed a crack cocaine crime before August 3, 2010, but were not sentenced until after that date. Although a federal saving statute generally prevents new laws from changing penalties for past conduct, this rule can be overcome by a 'fair implication' of contrary congressional intent. Such an implication is present here because applying the old, harsher minimums would create severe sentencing disparities and undermine the core goals of uniformity and proportionality established by the Sentencing Reform Act and the Fair Sentencing Act itself. Forcing judges to apply the old statutory minimums alongside the new Sentencing Guidelines (which were updated to reflect the FSA) would create a 'crazy quilt of sentences,' where a one-gram difference in crack quantity could result in a three-year difference in prison time. Congress could not have intended such an absurd and unfair result when it passed a law specifically designed to make sentencing fairer.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. The general saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, dictates that the new, more lenient mandatory minimums do not apply to preenactment offenders. This statute establishes a default rule that a change in penalty does not affect liability already incurred, unless the new law expressly provides otherwise. To override this strong presumption, there must be at least a 'clear implication' of congressional intent, which is absent here. The majority's arguments, such as Congress's desire to fix unfair sentences or its directive for emergency Guideline updates, are not persuasive enough to repeal the saving statute's application. The conflict between sentencing statutes can be resolved by applying the 'date of sentencing' rule to Guidelines and the saving statute to statutory penalties. The sentencing anomalies the majority fears are a product of how the Sentencing Commission chose to amend the Guidelines, not a direct command from Congress, and do not justify ignoring a long-standing rule of statutory interpretation.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split and significantly clarifies the temporal reach of ameliorative sentencing statutes. By prioritizing the sentencing goals of uniformity and proportionality over a rigid application of the federal saving statute (1 U.S.C. § 109), the Court established a strong precedent for applying reduced penalties to all defendants who have not yet been sentenced. This holding prevents the creation of new, arbitrary sentencing disparities between offenders based solely on whether their crime occurred before or after a new law's effective date. The case signals that courts should look for a 'fair implication' of congressional intent in the structure and purpose of sentencing reform legislation, rather than requiring an express statement of retroactivity, to apply more lenient sentences as broadly as possible short of reopening final judgments.
