Doncer v. Dickerson
81 S.W.3d 349, 2002 WL 960258 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
For the purpose of establishing standing to sue for conservatorship, a child's 'principal residence' under Texas Family Code § 102.003(b) is a factual determination based on where the child actually and consistently lives, and is not necessarily the same as the 'primary residence' legally designated in a joint managing conservatorship order.
Facts:
- Ray Doncer and Shelly Dickerson were divorced and named joint managing conservators of their son, Mikey.
- The custody agreement gave Dickerson the exclusive right to establish Mikey's 'primary residence' within Collin County.
- Under the joint conservatorship agreement, Mikey spent approximately 50% of his time living with his father, Ray, and his stepmother, Deborah Doncer.
- Deborah Doncer lived with Ray for over three years, during which this near 50-50 custody arrangement was in effect, and she developed a parent-child relationship with Mikey.
- Ray Doncer died on January 5, 2000.
- Shortly after Ray's death, Shelly Dickerson terminated all contact between Mikey and Deborah Doncer.
Procedural Posture:
- Deborah Doncer filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in a Texas trial court, seeking possessory conservatorship of her stepson, Mikey.
- Shelly Dickerson, the child's mother, moved to dismiss the suit, arguing Doncer lacked standing.
- The trial court held a hearing on the issue of standing.
- The trial court found that Mikey's 'principal residence' was with Dickerson and that Doncer therefore failed to meet the statutory requirements for standing.
- The trial court entered an order dismissing Doncer's suit for lack of standing.
- Doncer, as Appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals of Texas.
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Issue:
Does the term 'principal residence' in Texas Family Code § 102.003(b), used for calculating the time necessary for standing, carry the same legal meaning as 'primary residence' as designated in a joint managing conservatorship order?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ann Crawford McClure
No. The term 'principal residence' does not carry the same legal meaning as 'primary residence.' The court reasoned that the Legislature's use of different terms was deliberate. 'Primary residence' is a legal designation in a custody order, often for practical purposes like school enrollment, whereas 'principal residence' under the standing statute is a factual inquiry into where the child actually lives. The court looked to other sections of the Family Code where 'principal residence' is used in jurisdictional contexts, suggesting it relates to the factual reality of where a child dwells. Applying the common law elements of residency—a fixed, consistently occupied, and permanent abode—the court found that Mikey's consistent, substantial, and long-term presence in the Doncer home under the custody order meant he had a 'principal residence' there. Therefore, Doncer met the six-month residency requirement for standing under § 102.003(a)(11) and (b), even though Dickerson had the right to determine Mikey's 'primary residence'.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies standing for non-parents, particularly stepparents, in joint custody situations. By distinguishing 'principal residence' from the legal designation of 'primary residence,' the court prevents a parent with the primary designation from automatically blocking a deserving stepparent's suit for access after the other parent's death. This precedent shifts the focus from legal labels in a divorce decree to the substantive reality of the child's living arrangements and relationships. It empowers courts to consider the factual circumstances of a child's life, ensuring that individuals who have served in a consistent parental role have a chance to be heard on the issue of the child's best interest.
