Donald Snowden v. Jeremy Henning
72 F.4th 237 (2023)
Rule of Law:
An implied Bivens damages remedy for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against a federal officer does not arise in a 'new context' under the Abbasi framework if the claim is not meaningfully different from the original Bivens case, particularly if it involves the same type of officer, constitutional right, and a well-settled legal landscape for the alleged conduct.
Facts:
- Donald Snowden was staying at the Quality Inn in Carbondale, Illinois.
- On September 12, 2019, the front-desk clerk called Snowden to the lobby to pay for his room, knowing Special Agent Jeremy Henning with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was present to arrest him.
- An arrest warrant had been issued for Snowden after a federal grand jury indicted him for methamphetamine distribution.
- When Snowden arrived in the lobby, Agent Henning rushed at him, pushing him into a door and onto the ground.
- Snowden did not resist, but Agent Henning punched him several times in the face.
- Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket during the arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald Snowden, while in federal pretrial detention, filed a pro se complaint against Agent Henning, the DEA, Quality Inn, and the front-desk clerk in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
- The district court, screening the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (§ 1915A), construed it to allege a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim against Agent Henning for excessive force and allowed that claim to move forward.
- The district court also exercised supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law battery claim against Agent Henning and dismissed claims against the DEA, Quality Inn, and the front-desk clerk.
- Agent Henning moved to dismiss the Bivens claim for failure to state a claim, arguing it presented a new context and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens.
- Agent Henning also moved to convert the battery claim to one under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and substitute the United States as the defendant, with the government certifying he acted within the scope of employment.
- The district court dismissed the Bivens claim against Agent Henning, concluding it presented a new context due to identified factual and legal differences from Bivens, and held that special factors weighed against recognizing a Bivens claim.
- The district court declined to substitute the United States on the battery claim and convert it to an FTCA claim.
- With no federal claim remaining, the district court relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law battery claim and dismissed it without prejudice.
- Snowden appealed the dismissal of his Bivens claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a Fourth Amendment claim alleging excessive force during an arrest by a federal narcotics agent in a public place, under the authority of an arrest warrant, present a 'new Bivens context' such that an implied damages remedy against the agent is precluded?
Opinions:
Majority - Sykes, Chief Judge
No, a Fourth Amendment claim alleging excessive force during an arrest by a federal narcotics agent in a public place, under the authority of an arrest warrant, does not present a 'new Bivens context' because it is not meaningfully different from the original Bivens case. The Supreme Court's two-step framework for evaluating Bivens claims, established in Ziglar v. Abbasi, requires courts to first determine if the claim arises in a 'new context,' meaning it is 'different in a meaningful way' from previous Bivens cases. A difference is 'meaningful' if it involves factual distinctions or new legal issues that might alter the policy balance that initially justified the implied damages remedies in the Bivens trilogy, thereby risking encroachment on legislative authority. However, 'trivial' differences that do not implicate separation-of-powers concerns beyond what Bivens itself already approved are insufficient to create a new context. In this case, Agent Henning was a line-level federal narcotics officer, the same kind of defendant as in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, and Snowden alleged a Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable force during an arrest, directly mirroring an allegation present in the original Bivens complaint. The legal landscape for excessive force claims is well-settled under the Graham v. Connor test, providing clear guidance to officers. The court found that factual distinctions such as the location of the arrest (hotel lobby versus a home), the presence of an arrest warrant (versus a warrantless arrest), or the number of officers involved (one versus six) were 'trivial' and did not alter the policy balance or introduce new separation-of-powers concerns. The claim did not involve issues like national security (Hernández v. Mesa), different constitutional rights coupled with alternative remedies (Abbasi), or a different class of defendant (Minneci v. Pollard). Therefore, Snowden’s claim falls squarely within the 'settled law of Bivens' in the common sphere of law enforcement and may proceed, as it does not meaningfully differ from Bivens itself.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the narrow yet enduring scope of the original Bivens remedy, particularly in Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against federal agents. It establishes that minor factual variations in an arrest scenario—such as location, presence of a warrant, or number of officers—do not create a 'new context' under the Abbasi framework if they do not fundamentally alter the underlying policy balance or separation-of-powers considerations. This ruling provides a limited, but important, avenue for individuals to seek damages against federal officers for constitutional torts that closely parallel the foundational Bivens decision, while reinforcing the general judicial reluctance to expand Bivens beyond its established contexts. This decision suggests courts should not be overly eager to find a 'new context' where the core legal and factual dispute remains aligned with the original Bivens scenario, offering some stability for certain types of claims.
