Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson
443 F.3d 12 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A prior judicial construction of a statute trumps a subsequent contrary agency interpretation only if the prior court decision held that its construction followed from the unambiguous terms of the statute. If the statute is ambiguous, a reasonable agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference and will supersede the prior judicial reading.
Facts:
- Dominion owns an electrical generating facility in Somerset, Massachusetts that utilizes an 'open-cycle' cooling system.
- This system withdraws water from local rivers, uses it as a coolant, and then discharges the heated water into Mount Hope Bay.
- The discharge of this heated water is regulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA) through a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
- In 1998, Dominion applied to the EPA for the renewal of its NPDES permit and a related thermal variance authorization.
Procedural Posture:
- The EPA issued a proposed final NPDES permit to Dominion, rejecting its request for a thermal variance.
- Dominion sought review before the Environmental Appeals Board (the Board) and requested a formal evidentiary hearing.
- The Board accepted the petition for review but denied the request for an evidentiary hearing, consistent with new EPA regulations.
- Dominion filed a citizen's suit against the EPA in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking to compel the agency to hold the hearing.
- The EPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss.
- Dominion (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, with the EPA (appellee) as the opposing party.
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Issue:
Does the Clean Water Act impose a non-discretionary duty on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide a formal evidentiary hearing for a permit application, notwithstanding a new agency regulation eliminating such hearings, when a prior circuit court decision had interpreted the Act to require one?
Opinions:
Majority - Selya, Circuit Judge
No. The Clean Water Act does not impose a non-discretionary duty on the EPA to provide a formal evidentiary hearing. The court's prior interpretation in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, which required such a hearing, must yield to the EPA's subsequent, reasonable regulation that eliminated this requirement. The Supreme Court's decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X established that a court's prior statutory construction only binds an agency if the court found the statutory language to be unambiguous. Here, the Seacoast court did not find the CWA's 'public hearing' language to be unambiguous; rather, it relied on a presumption about congressional intent. Because the statute is ambiguous, the EPA's later interpretation—concluding that informal hearings suffice—is a permissible construction entitled to Chevron deference. Therefore, the EPA's duty to hold a hearing is discretionary, not mandatory, and the citizen's suit fails for lack of jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision illustrates the powerful effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brand X on the principles of stare decisis and agency deference. It clarifies that a circuit court's own precedent interpreting a statute can be effectively superseded by a later, contrary agency regulation, as long as the original precedent did not rest on a finding of unambiguous statutory language. This reinforces the Chevron doctrine, giving administrative agencies significant authority to reinterpret statutes they administer, even in areas where courts have previously spoken. This holding diminishes the finality of judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes and solidifies agency power to adapt regulatory schemes over time.
