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Doe v. McKay

Illinois Supreme Court
700 N.E.2d 1018, 233 Ill. Dec. 310, 183 Ill.2d 272 (1998)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A therapist's duty of care is owed exclusively to the patient and does not extend to nonpatient third parties, such as the patient's parents. Consequently, a parent cannot maintain a cause of action against their adult child's therapist for either negligent treatment of the child or for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship resulting in loss of society and companionship.


Facts:

  • Beginning in 1990, John Doe's adult daughter, Jane Doe, underwent psychological treatment with Dr. Bobbie McKay.
  • During the course of treatment, Jane Doe supposedly discovered repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse allegedly committed by her father, John Doe.
  • On February 6, 1992, Dr. McKay held a counseling session attended by herself, Jane Doe, and John Doe, during which Jane Doe accused her father of the abuse.
  • In the session, Dr. McKay told John Doe that his daughter's memories had been repressed and that he had likely repressed his own memories of the abuse.
  • Dr. McKay recommended that John Doe begin treatment with another therapist in her practice, Vicki Seglin, which he did.
  • John Doe paid for his daughter's services with Dr. McKay for a period in 1992 and also paid for his own services with Seglin.
  • John Doe denies that he ever sexually abused his daughter and alleges Dr. McKay's methods are not generally accepted by the psychological community.

Procedural Posture:

  • John Doe sued Dr. Bobbie McKay and her professional corporation in the circuit court of Du Page County on several theories, including negligence and intentional interference with a family relationship.
  • The defendants filed a motion to dismiss certain counts for failure to state a cause of action.
  • The circuit court (trial court) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the counts for negligence toward Jane Doe and for intentional interference with a family relationship.
  • The plaintiff, John Doe, appealed the dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court.
  • The appellate court reversed the circuit court's dismissal, holding that the plaintiff had stated valid causes of action.
  • The defendants, Dr. McKay and her corporation, appealed the appellate court's decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

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Issue:

Does a therapist owe a legal duty to a non-patient parent for psychological harm and loss of companionship allegedly resulting from the therapist's treatment of the parent's adult child?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Miller

No. A therapist's duty of care runs only to the patient, not to nonpatient third parties. Extending a therapist's duty to a patient's family members would create divided loyalties, forcing the therapist to weigh the patient's interests against the potential impact on third parties, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the therapist's primary obligation to the patient. Such an extension would also undermine the critical public policy of patient-therapist confidentiality, as a therapist could not adequately defend against a third-party lawsuit without revealing privileged communications. The court's prior ruling in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital, which barred malpractice actions by third parties, is controlling. Furthermore, claims for loss of society and companionship for non-fatal injuries are barred under the reasoning of Dralle v. Ruder, regardless of whether the alleged interference is characterized as 'direct' or 'indirect.'


Dissenting - Justice Harrison

Yes. A duty should be recognized because the plaintiff, John Doe, was not a random third party but was a family member whom the therapist made an integral part of the patient's treatment. By orchestrating a confrontational session involving the plaintiff as a key part of the therapeutic strategy, the therapist created a foreseeable risk of harm to him. In this specific context, concerns about patient confidentiality and divided loyalty are misplaced because the therapist, with the patient's consent, intentionally involved the third-party parent in the treatment. The situation is analogous to O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital, where a duty was recognized toward a parent invited to participate in a child's medical care.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces a strict privity rule in the context of psychological malpractice, affirming that a therapist's legal duty is owed solely to the patient. By refusing to extend a duty to non-patient family members, the court prioritized the integrity and confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship over the interests of third parties who may be harmed by the therapy's outcome. The ruling significantly limits the ability of family members to sue therapists for familial estrangement or other harms allegedly caused by 'repressed memory' therapy. It also clarifies that the bar on recovering for loss of society in non-fatal injury cases, established in Dralle, applies even to claims of direct and intentional interference with a family relationship.

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