Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc.
527 F.3d 358, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11519, 91 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,222 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, protects women from employment discrimination based on their decision to have an abortion. An abortion is considered a "related medical condition" under the statute, and termination of employment for this reason constitutes unlawful sex-based discrimination.
Facts:
- C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. (CARS) hired Jane Doe as a graphic artist in June 1999, where she was supervised by Vice-President Fred Kohl.
- In May 2000, Doe became pregnant and informed Kohl.
- On August 7, 2000, Doe learned of complications with her pregnancy, and on August 9, her doctor recommended that the pregnancy be terminated due to severe fetal deformities.
- Doe's husband communicated with Kohl throughout this period, keeping him informed of the situation and Doe's necessary absences.
- On August 10, Doe's husband testified that he called Kohl, informed him that the pregnancy would be terminated the next day, and received Kohl's approval for Doe to take a one-week vacation to recover.
- Doe's pregnancy was terminated on Friday, August 11.
- On Wednesday, August 16, the day of the baby's funeral, Doe's sister-in-law observed Doe's personal belongings being packed up at her desk.
- Later that day, Kohl informed Doe via telephone that her employment had been terminated.
Procedural Posture:
- Jane Doe filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and was issued a right-to-sue letter.
- Doe filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against her former employer, C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.
- CARS moved for summary judgment, arguing Doe could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
- The District Court granted CARS' motion for summary judgment.
- Doe, as appellant, appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Title VII's prohibition on sex-based discrimination, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include discrimination based on 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,' protect an employee from being terminated for having an abortion?
Opinions:
Majority - Nygaard, Circuit Judge
Yes. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act's protections extend to women who have elected to terminate their pregnancies. The plain language of the statute, which covers 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,' along with its legislative history and deferential EEOC guidelines, supports the conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman because she has exercised her right to have an abortion. The court now holds that the term 'related medical conditions' includes an abortion. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court found Doe established a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) her employer knew of her pregnancy and related medical condition; (2) she was qualified for her job; (3) she was terminated; and (4) there was a nexus between her condition and termination. This nexus was established through evidence of disparate treatment (other temporarily disabled employees were not required to call in daily), the close temporal proximity between the abortion and her firing (three working days), and a supervisor's remark that she 'didn't want to take responsibility,' which could suggest discriminatory animus. Doe also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's stated reason for termination—job abandonment—was pretextual, thereby making summary judgment for the employer inappropriate.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant precedent within the Third Circuit by explicitly holding, as a matter of first impression, that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act protects an employee from adverse employment actions based on her choice to have an abortion. The decision solidifies that 'related medical conditions' is a broad category encompassing pregnancy termination. Furthermore, the analysis reinforces that the prima facie burden in discrimination cases is not onerous and can be met through a combination of circumstantial evidence, such as temporal proximity, disparate treatment, and potentially biased remarks by a decision-maker. This ruling makes it more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment in such cases where the employee can present a coherent, factually-disputed narrative of discrimination.
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